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PARTl
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
76-5-101.

"Prisoner" defined.

For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the
confinement is legal.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-101; 1994, ch. 36, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective March 2, 1994, inserted "or a

facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the Division of Youth Corrections."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

76-5-102.

Assault.

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L.
1974,ch.32,§ 38;1989,ch.51,§
1;1991,ch.
75, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments.
- Laws
1974, ch. 32, § 38 repealed former§ 76-5-102,
as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102,
relating to assault, and enacted present § 765-102.

Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "or
creates a substantial risk of" in Subsection
(l)(c).

Cross-References. - Bus hijacking, assault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504.
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery,
§ 10-8-47.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence.
Immediacy of threat.
Included offenses.
Intent.
Object of threat.
-Victim.
Verdict.
-Ambiguous verdict.
- Variance from verdict.
Cited.

Evidence.
Introduction of defendant's commitment papers to establish that defendant was an inmate
of the state prison was proper in prosecution for
assault by a convict with a deadly weapon.
State v. Duran, 522 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1974).
Immediacy of threat.
Although the proximity of the assailant to
the victim has some relevance in determining
whether the threat was accompanied by an
"immediate" show of force, the absence of evidence in the record regarding the exact dis-

100

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
tance between the victim and the defendant did
not require reversal on insufficiency of evidence
grounds given the surrounding circumstances.
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992).

Included offenses.
In prosecution under former§ 76-7-7, which
described offense of assault with intent to commit rape or mayhem, court had to instruct jury
that defendant could be convicted of simple
assault; attempt to commit offense charged was
included in the offense under former Penal
Code definition of attempts. State v. Hyams, 64
Utah 285, 230 P. 349 (1924).
In prosecution for rape, it was not error to
charge that assault was an included offense
where the evidence would have supported a
finding of the elements of this crime. State v.
Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
Crime of simple assault was included in
offense of indecent assault. State v. Waid, 92
Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937).
The offense of assault is a lesser included
offense of aggravated sexual assault, § 76-5405. State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982).
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnaping was entitled to a jury instruction on assault
as a lesser included offense since there was
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of
evidence, however unlikely that might have
been, it could have voted to acquit him of
aggravated kidnaping and convict him of assault. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984).
Assault is a lesser included offense of forcible
sexual abuse. State v. Jones, 243 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Intent.
Intent with which assault is made is of es-

76-5-102.3

sence in offense of assault with intent to commit rape; to justify conviction jury must have
been satisfied that defendant had ability and
intended to gratify his passions on person of
woman assaulted, and to do so regardless of
any resistance she might have made. State v.
McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818 (1898).

Object of threat.
-Victim.
One cannot be charged with an aggravated
assault of a particular person by "threatening
to do bodily injury to [another person]." The
"another" referred to in this section and § 765-103 is the ultimate victim of the assault, not
any other person. State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Verdict.
-Ambiguous verdict.
If verdict left it doubtful as to whether defendant was found guilty of assault, or of an
assault with deadly weapon, defendant was
entitled to have uncertainty resolved in his
favor. State v. Kakarikos, 45 Utah 470, 146 P.
750 (1915).
-Variance from verdict.
Where jury returned verdict that defendant
was guilty of attempt to commit rape, court
could not enter judgment that defendant was
guilty of different offense of assault with intent
to commit rape. State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285,
230 P. 349 (1924).
Cited in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1985); Utah Dep't of Cors. v. Despain, 824 P.2d
439 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Tinoco, 860
P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery§ 9.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery§ 62.
A.L.R. -Assault and battery: sexual nature
of physical contact as aggravating offense, 63
A.L.R.3d 225.
Liability for injury to martial arts participant, 47 A.L.R.4th 403.
Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting
criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.
Admissibility of expert opinion stating

76-5-102.3.

whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Transmission or risk or transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HN) or acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as basis
for prosecution or sentencing in criminal or
military discipline case, 13 A.L.R.5th 628.
Key Numbers. - Assault and Battery
48.

Assault against school employees.

(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private school, with
knowledge that the individual is an employee, and when the employee is acting
within the scope of his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
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(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.3, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 163, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 163

76-5-102.4.

became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Assault against peace officer.

Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Peace officers, Title 77, Chapter la.

History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.4, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 32; 1987, ch. 23, § 1.
Cross-References. -Assault on conservation officer, § 23-20-26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assault by prisoner.
Burden of proof.
Unlawful search of premises.
Cited.

Assault by prisoner.
Defendant's claim that his assault on a peace
officer could have been charged under this
section instead of § 76-5-102.5 did not entitle
him to have his felony conviction reduced to a
misdemeanor because this section and § 76-5102.5 do not proscribe identical conduct and
defendant was properly charged under § 76-5102.5. State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Burden of proof.
This section does not require that the state
prove that the precise act the officer is perform-

ing is not legally challengeable, i.e., that the
arrest or search being effected is entirely lawful
and beyond challenge. All that must be shown
is that the officer is acting within the "scope of
authority of a peace officer." State v. Gardiner,
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991).

Unlawful search of premises.
Defendant's convictions of assaulting a peace
officer and interfering with a peace officer were
affirmed, where the officer was acting within
the scope of his authority in responding to a
complaint regarding a party where minors
were consuming alcohol, even though his attempted search of the premises was later found
to be unlawful. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568
(Utah 1991).
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery§ 87.

76-5-102.5.

C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery§ 81.

Assault by prisoner.

Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty
of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.5, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 33.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assault against peace officer.
Evidence of assault.
-Sufficient.
Cited.

Assault against peace officer.
This section and § 76-5-102.4 do not proscribe identical conduct when the assault is
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to
different classes of persons, the former applying to "any person" and the latter applying to
"any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Evidence of assault.
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the
videotape of all bookings, including the defen-

dant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if
there was no request to retain it, and the
defendant sought dismissal of the charge that
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police
officer, because there was no showing that loss
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez,
761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

-Sufficient.
Jury verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory
defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation, was supported by the evidence. State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
I

Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional

officer.

Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.6, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 149, § 1; 1994, ch. 37, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or otherwise propels."

Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 59 became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Spitting.
Spitting on a correctional officer was not a
crimeunder this section, as the only prohibited
means of propelling a substance or object was

by throwing. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (decided before 1994 amendment
adding "or otherwise propels").

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault ifhe commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2.

Cross-References. - Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dangerous weapon.
Defense of habitation.
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
-Flight.
- Vicarious liability.
Jury question.
Object of threat.
-Victim.
Recklessness.
Self-defense.
Serious bodily injury.
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished.
Voluntary intoxication.
Cited.

Dangerous weapon.
Under former statute which described assault with deadly weapon, character of weapon
could be inferred from wounds or other indicia,
even though name or precise character of the
instrument could not be proven. State v.
Jukanovich, 45 Utah 372, 146 P. 289 (1915).
A razor could be a deadly weapon under
former statute describing assault with a deadly
weapon. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P.
1071 (1915).
Instructing jury that fist could under certain
circumstances become deadly or dangerous
weapon was prejudicial error as it might have
directed minds of jury away from crucial issue
as to whether defendant used razor blade as a
deadly weapon. State v. Ireland, 22 Utah 2d 17,
447 P.2d 375 (1968).
Defense of habitation.
Defendant's appearances at his estranged
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him
no proprietary right or justification to consider
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation,"
and his aggravated assault on his wife's overnight male companion was therefore not justified by § 76-2-405. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986).
Evidence.
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the
trial court's admission of a knife, similar to the
one used in the assault, and a ruler, illustrative
of the testimony of a witness and indicative of
the actual length of the weapon, was not unduly prejudicial. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168
(Utah 1985).
-Sufficient.
Evidence indicating

that

defendant

had

threatened his former wife and her father with
loaded sawed-off shotgun was sufficient, if believed by jury, to support conviction of defendant for assault with deadly weapon. State v.
Dunnivan, 26 Utah 2d 147,486 P.2d 393 (1971).
The defendant's conduct in pulling a loaded
.38 caliber revolver from his waistband and
shooting one of his victims in the upper leg,
followed by threats to both victims, was sufficient evidence to support a conviction under
Subsection (l)(b). State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301
(Utah 1985).
Where the defendant testified at trial that he
was angered by his wife's comments, so he
struck her, and he did not contradict her testimony, or that of the doctor, which described the
seriousness of the injuries, the combination of
the uncontroverted testimony from the defendant, his wife, and her physician established
overwhelming evidence to support a conviction
of aggravated assault. State v. Harper, 761 P.2d
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Included offense.
Charge of assault with intent to do bodily
harm also included simple assault; court had to
submit possible verdict of simple assault to
jury. State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130
(1937).
The offense of aggravated assault is a lesser
included offense of aggravated sexual assault,
§ 76-5-405. State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah
1982).
Defendant charged with aggravated assault
committed by use of a deadly weapon was
entitled to a jury instruction regarding offense
of threatening with a dangerous weapon, § 7610-506, as a lesser included offense where two
offenses had overlapping elements, facts of case
tended to prove both offenses, and evidence was
subject to an interpretation which provided
both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting
defendant of the aggravated assault charge and
convicting him of threatening with a dangerous
weapon. State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah
1984).
Because the assaults committed upon victims
were indisputably aggravated, there would
have been no basis for finding defendant guilty
of the lesser crime of assault if he was found
innocent of the greater crime of aggravated
assault. State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah
1986).
Trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury on the offense of aggravated assault at
defendant's trial for second-degree murder, as
the evidence would not support both an acquittal on the murder charge and a conviction on
the aggravated assault charge. State v. Velarde,
734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986).
Refusal to give defendant's requested in-

104

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
struction on aggravated assault at his trial for
second-degree murder was reversible error,
where the jury needed to determine whether
the defendant lacked the intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury, which would permit an
acquittal on the murder charge while allowing
a conviction on the aggravated assault charge.
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986).
Aggravated assault was a lesser and included
offense ofaggravated burglary, because the jury
was not required to find any additional elements to convict defendant of aggravated assault once it had found him guilty of aggravated
burglary. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah
1988).

Indictment or information.
An information for assault and battery with
intent to murder did not necessarily include
assault with a deadly weapon; an information
for the former need not have described the
instrument with which assault was made as a
deadly weapon. State v. Jukanovich, 45 Utah
372, 146 P. 289 (1915); State v. Kakarikos, 45
Utah 470, 146 P. 750 (1915).
Words "without just cause or excuse" in former section defining assault with deadly
weapon need not have been used in indictment.
State v. McDonald, 14 Utah 173, 46 P. 872
(1896).
Instructions.
-Flight.
It was error to give any flight instruction
where no flight occurred after commission of
the crime charged, since the defendant was
charged with aggravated assault but the "aggravating'' element, his knife, was not drawn
until he was on the ground in front of the store
after he had run from the initial encounter.
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
-Vicarious liability.
In prosecution for assault with deadly
weapon and attempted burglary, where there
was an inference of joint participation based
upon circumstantial evidence that both defendants were armed and that one of them apparently drove escape vehicle and was also present
at scene, evidence was sufficient to warrant
instruction on the law of principals. State v.
Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 (1963).
Jury question.
Degree of injury or harm inflicted or threatened was for jury to determine. State v.
Kakarikos, 45 Utah 470, 146 P. 750 (1915).
Object of threat.
-Victim.
One cannot be charged with an aggravated
assault of a particular person by "threatening

76-5-103

to do bodily injury to [another person]." The
"another" referred to in § 76-5-102 and this
section is the ultimate victim of the assault, not
any other person. State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Recklessness.
Reckless conduct using means or force likely
to produce serious bodily injury constitutes
aggravated assault under Subsection (l)(b); defendant's act of suddenly and without provocation throwing or swinging a glass from which
he had been drinking, striking victim in face,
was aggravated assault despite defendant's
claim that he threw the glass in an attempt to
break it against the side of a nearby cliff and
was unaware victim was in the way. In re
McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978).
Trial court did not err in finding that defendant acted recklessly in placing a rattlesnake
on the shoulders of a two-year-old child. State v.
Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989).
Self-defense.
In prosecution for assault with deadly
weapon with intent to commit bodily harm,
defendant was not required to establish his
claim of self-defense by preponderance of evidence, but was entitled to acquittal if jury
entertained reasonable doubt as to whether or
not he acted in self-defense. State v. Talarico, 57
Utah 229, 193 P. 860 (1920).
In prosecution for assault with deadly
weapon, with intent to commit bodily harm,
refusal to give instruction on self-defense was
not error prejudicial to substantial rights of
defendant, where no evidence supported selfdefense. State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 229, 193 P.
860 (1920).
Trial court properly refused jury instruction
on self-defense tendered by defendant charged
with assault with deadly weapon; since facts
were such that reasonable men could not have
concluded that defendant acted in self-defense,
there was no substantial evidence to justify the
instruction requested. State v. Castillo, 23 Utah
2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969).
Where defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for firing shots at another man,
the existence of contradictory testimony on the
issue of self-defense, by itself, was not sufficient
grounds for reversal. State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701
(Utah 1985).
Serious bodily injury.
Defendant must have a specific intent to
inflict serious bodily injury at the time of the
confrontation, and the injuries must create a
substantial serious permanent disfigurement,
or a serious protracted loss or impairment of
function of body members or organs, or a substantial risk of death, to establish an intentional causing of serious bodily injury. State ex
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rel. Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742 (Utah 1977).
Evidence was sufficient to establish that victim sustained serious bodily injury where he
had been beaten so badly that he did not regain
consciousness for 15 to 18 hours after assault,
he had dried blood in his nose and throat, and
attending doctor testified he was in a very
dangerous state and very well could have died.
State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984).
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished.
Aggravated assault committed by use of a
deadly weapon (now "dangerous weapon") or
such means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury is not the same crime
proscribed by§ 76-10-506, drawing or exhibiting any dangerous weapon in an angry and
threatening manner, and a person convicted
under this section is not entitled to receive the
misdemeanor penalty provided by§ 76-10-506.
State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979).
Voluntary intoxication.
Trial judge, as trier offact, having found that

any inability of defendant to understand right
and wrong and to adhere to right resulted from
his voluntary intoxication, could properly find
defendant guilty under this section, notwithstanding conflicting opinions by alienists on
insanity. State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah
1976).
A defendant's voluntary intoxication does not
preclude his conviction for aggravated assault
since criminal responsibility for that crime can
be established through recklessness, and voluntary intoxication does not absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless acts.
State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985).
Cited in State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240 (Utah
1985); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986);
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988); State
v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988); State v.
Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988); State v.
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Utah Dep't of Cors. v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d
988 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Streeter, 860
P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery § 48.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J .S. Assault and Battery§ 72.
A.L.R. - Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.
Criminal assault or battery statutes making
attack on elderly person a special or aggravated
offense, 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.
Admissibility of expert opinion stating

76-5-103.5.

Aggravated

whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Sufficiency of bodily injury to support charge
of aggravated assault, 5 A.L.R.5th 243.
Kicking as aggravated assault, or assault
with dangerous or deadly weapon, 19 A.L.R.5th
823.
Key Numbers. - Assault and Battery
54.

assault by prisoner.

(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree, who
commits aggravated assault is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree who
commits aggravated assault is guilty of:
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury was caused; or
(b) 11 capital felony if serious bodily injury was intentionally caused.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103.5, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 34.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence.
It was permissible for the state to introduce
evidence of defendant's prior conviction to
prove an element of the offense for which he

was on trial, i.e., to show that he was in fact a
"prisoner" at the time of the assault. State v.
Lancaster, 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988).
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76-5-104.

76-5-106

Consensual altercation no defense to homicide
or assault if dangerous weapon used.

In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 was used.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-104; 1989, ch. 170, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery §§ 66, 68.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery§ 85.

76-5-105.

Key Numbers. - Assault and Battery
65.

<i=>

Mayhem.

[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally deprives a human being
of a member of his body, or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or
disables the tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
mayhem.
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-105.
C::ompiler'sNotes. -The bracketed subsec-

tion designation "(l)" was added by the compiler.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Instructions.
In prosecution for mayhem, arising from qefendant's alleged biting off end of sister-in-law's

nose, instructions on defendant's intoxication,
flight, and intent were not erroneous. State v.
Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P.2d 692 (1935).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mayhem and
Related Offenses § 1.

76-5-l06.

C.J.S. - 56 C.J.S. Mayhem § 3.
Key Numbers. - Mayhem <i=>7.

Harassment.

(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass
another, he communicates in writing a threat to commit any violent felony.
(2) Harassment is a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-106, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-106.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 31AAm. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq.

76-5-106.5.

Definitions

C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Threats & Unlawful Communications § 1.

- Crime of stalking.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written
threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly
resided in the household within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or
a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person.
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor.
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is
substantially similar to the offense of stalking; or
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any
crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony,
in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony
offense.
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of
stalking;
(b) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or
jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of
stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of
offenses under Subsections (5)(a) and (b); or
(d) has been previously convicted two or more times offelony offenses in
Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking
was also a victim of the previous felony offenses.
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History: C. 1953, 76-5-106.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 188, § 1; 1994, ch. 206, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsections (1) and (2) to such an extent that a

76-5-107.

76-5-107.5

detailed comparison is impracticable and added
Subsections (4) and (5).
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 188
became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Threat against life or property - Penalty.

(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to
commit any offense involving violence with intent to:
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with emergencies;
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or
other form of transportation.
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to
which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated by
a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-107, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-107; 1988, ch. 38, § 1.
Cross-References. - Bus Passenger Safety

Act, hijacking, bombing and other offenses,
§§ 76-10-1501 to 76-10-1511.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 31AAm. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq.
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Threats & Unlawful Communications § 1.

76-5-107.5. Prohibition
alties.

A.L.R. - Validity and construction of terroristic threat statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949.

of "hazing" -

Definitions

-

Pen-

(1) "Hazing" means any action or situation that, for the purpose of initiation,
admission into, affiliation with, or as a condition for continued membership in
any organization:
(a) recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health
or safety of any person;
(b) willfully destroys or removes public or private property;
(c) involves any brutality of a physical nature such as whipping,
beating, branding, forced calisthenics, or exposure to the elements;
(d) involves forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug, or other
substance or any other forced physical activity that could adversely affect
the physical health and safety of the individual;
(e) involves any activity that would subject the individual to extreme
mental stress, such as sleep deprivation, forced exclusion from social
contact, forced conduct that could result in extreme embarrassment, or
any other forced activity that could adversely affect the mental health or
dignity of the individual; or
(f) involves brutality toward or willful mistreatment of any animal.
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(2) Under Subsection (1) any activity as described upon which the initiation,
admission into, affiliation with, or continued membership in an organization is
directly or indirectly conditioned is presumed to be "forced."
(3) An actor who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally hazes another is
guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor if there are no aggravating circumstances;
(b) class A misdemeanor if the act of hazing involves the operation or
other use of a motor vehicle;
(c) third degree felony if the act of hazing involves the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon;
(d) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious bodily injury to a
person; or
(e) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection (d) involves the use
of a deadly or dangerous weapon.
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in reporting of an
alleged hazing is :pot subject to any civil or criminal liability regarding the
reporting.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-107.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch.' 59, § 1.

76-5-108.

Protective orders restraining
- Violation.

abuse of another

Any person who has been restrained from abusing or contacting another or
ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the other's
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6,
or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates that order after having been properly
served with it, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-108, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 111, § 10; 1984, ch. 12, § 1; 1991,
ch. 75, § 4; 1993, ch. 137, § 12.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "or
contacting another or ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the
other's residence, employment, or other place

76-5-109.

as ordered by the court under" for "another, or
who has been ordered to vacate a dwelling by,"
inserted "or ex parte protective order," and
made a minor stylistic change.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
substituted "class A misdemeanor" for "class B
misdemeanor."

Child abuse.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age or less.
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which
impairs the physical condition of the child, including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare
and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in this section.
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries
which seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical
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torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial
bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain,
whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to
impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the
same person, either at the same time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or
organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the
second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care
or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted in the county or
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed, where the
existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the
defendant resides.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-109, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 64, § 1; 1992, ch. 192, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, subdivided and
rewrote Subsection (l)(b), substituting the
present language for former similar provisions
and transferring the rest to Subsection (l)(c); in
Subsection (l)(c), designated the existing provisions as Subsection (l)(c)(viii), except for a

reference to "substantial risk of death" now in
the introductory language, and added the rest
of the subsection; in Subsections (2) and (3),
substituted "or" for "and" after "having the
care"; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment, § 62A-4a-301
et seq.
Reporting requirements, § 62A-4a-403.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Multiple injuries.
Cited.

Multiple injuries.
Multiple injuries that cumulatively result in
impairment of a child's physical condition will

sustain a second-degree felony conviction
where the impairment is of the requisite magnitude and the perpetrator's conduct is knowing or intentional. State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey - 1981, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 162.
- The Utah Child Protection System: Analysis
and Proposals for Change, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 1.
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child
Abuse Litigation, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 479.
Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing

76-5-110.

Defendants'
Confrontation
Clause Rights
Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 407.
AL.R. - Failure of state or local government to protect child abuse victim as violation
of federal constitutional right, 79 A.L.R. Fed.
514.

Abuse or neglect of disabled child.

( 1) As used in this section:
(a) "Abuse" means physical injury, as that term is defined in Subsection
76-5-109(1)(b), or unreasonable confinement.
(b) "Caretaker" means:
(i) any parent, legal guardian, or other person having under his
care and custody a disabled child; or
(ii) any person, corporation, or public institution that has assumed
by contract or court order the responsibility to provide food, shelter,
clothing, medical, and other necessities to a disabled child.
(c) "Disabled child" means any person under 18 years of age who is
impaired because of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or
disability, or other cause, to the extent that he is unable to care for his own
personal safety or to provide necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care.
(d) "Neglect" means failure by a caretaker to provide care, nutrition,
clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical care.
(2) Any caretaker who abuses or neglects a disabled child is guilty of a third
degree felony. A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment
by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in
accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious
denomination of which the caretaker is a member or adherent shall not for that
reason alone be considered to be in violation under this section. However, this
exception shall not preclude a court from ordering medical services from a
physician licensed to engage in the practice of medicine to be provided to the
child where there is substantial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-110, enacted by L.
1988,ch.39,§
1; 1993,ch.299,§
1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, subdivided Subsection (l)(b), added Subsection (l)(b)(i), making
related changes, and added the second and

third sentences of Subsection (2).
Compiler's Notes. - The defined terms in
this section were alphabetized by the compiler
at the direction of the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel.
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PART2
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
76-5-201.

Criminal homicide - Elements - Designations
of offenses.

(1) (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of
another human being, including an unborn child.
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death
of an unborn child caused by an abortion.
(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-201; 1983, ch. 90, § 3;
1983,ch.95,§ 1; 1991,ch. 10,§ 7;1991 (1st
S.S.), ch. 2, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "aggravated murder, murder" for "murder in the
first and second degree" in Subsection (2).
The 1991 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1991, subdivided Subsection (1) and in

Subsection (l)(b) deleted "against a mother or a
physician" after "criminal homicide" and
"where the abortion was permitted by law and
the required consent was lawfully given" from
the end.
Cross-References. -Attempt,§
76-4-101.
Criminal conduct requirements, § 76-2-101.
Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and
criminal negligence defined, § 76-2-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Corpus delicti.
Elements.
Evidence.
Issues, proof and variance.
Jury determination.
Mental state.
Self-defense.
Corpus delicti.
"Corpus delicti," as applied to homicide cases,
was proved when the fact of death and the
criminal agency of another person as the cause
thereof were shown; proof of death due to
hemorrhage caused by external violence to
deceased's face and head was sufficient without
determining what instruments were used.
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936).
Elements.
In a case of homicide, if it appears that the
elements of first degree murder are lacking and
that there are no exceptions of manslaughter
involved, then upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a criminal homicide was perpetrated, the verdict should be murder in the
second degree. Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d 1107
(Utah 1975) (decided before 1991 substitution
of aggravated murder and murder for first and
second degree murder).

Evidence.
Proof of malice and intent could be shown by
either direct or circumstantial evidence in accordance with general rules governing evidence
in criminal cases; without shifting burden of
proof from prosecution, they could be presumed
from the fact of the killing in absence of explanatory facts and circumstances, or they could be
inferred from attendant facts and circumstances. State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275
(1912).
Malice and premeditation could not be presumed from use of gun when facts and circumstances to the contrary were shown, but facts
and circumstances, by their very nature, could
show premeditation, deliberation and malice
aforethought; showing of either express or implied malice was sufficient proof of malice.
State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126
P.2d 1047 (1942).
Issues, proof and variance.
If no particular degree of homicide was
charged, under plea of not guilty any degree
could be proven; a charge included lesser degrees of the offense. State v. Spencer, 101 Utah
287, 121 P.2d 912 (1942).
Jury determination.
It was for jury to determine whether evidence
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of criminal negligence if the act is done either
knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. State v.
Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977).

was sufficient to show that accused had formed
specific design to kill deceased before he struck
fatal blow, an element of first degree murder, as
opposed to premeditated design to cause great
bodily injury or to do an act likely to cause such
injury, an element of second degree murder.
State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003
(1944).

Self-defense.
The absence of self-defense is not one of the
prima facie elements of homicide needed to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state.
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).

Mental state.
Criminal homicide does not require a finding

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - For Everything There Is a Season: The Right to Die in
the United States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 545.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Note,
State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution to Utah's
Depraved Indifference Mens Rea Problem, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 177 (1986).
Prosecuting Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: The State's Interest in Protecting the
Rights of a Fetus Versus the Mother's Constitutional Rights to Due Process, Privacy and
Equal Protection, 17 J. Contemp. L. 325 (1991).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 7.
C.J.S. - 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 29, 31.
A.L.R. - Insulting words as provocation of
homicide or as reducing the degree thereof, 2
A.L.R.3d 1293.
Homicide by automobile as murder, 21
A.L.R.3d 116.
Mental or emotional condition as diminishing responsibility for crime, 22 A.L.R.3d 1228.
Criminal liability for death resulting from
unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or
drugs to another, 32 A.L.R.3d 589.
Homicide based on killing of unborn child, 40
A.L.R.3d 444.
Application of felony-murder doctrine where
the felony relied upon is an includible offense
with the homicide, 40 A.L.R.3d 1341.

76-5-202.

Homicide predicated on improper treatment
of disease or injury, 45 A.L.R.3d 114.
What felonies are inherently or foreseeably
dangerous to human life for purposes offelonymurder doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3d 397.
Criminal liability where act of killing is done
by one resisting felony or other unlawful act
committed by defendant, 56 A.L.R.3d 239.
Homicide by withholding food, clothing, or
shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.
Corporation's criminal liability for homicide,
45 A.L.R.4th 1021.
Homicide: cremation of victim's body as violation of accused's rights, 70 A.L.R.4th 1091.
Admissibility of expert opinion stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Validity and construction of "extreme indifference" murder statute, 7 A.L.R.5th 758.
Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of evidence as to tests made to ascertain distance
from gun to victim when gun was fired, 11
A.L.R.5th 497.
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case
that victim was threatened by one other than
defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831.
Key Numbers. - Homicide ,s,,, 7 et seq.

Aggravated murder.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or
other correctional institution;
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed;
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other
than the victim and the actor;
(d) the homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child,
object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child,
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sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the age of 14 years, as
otherwise defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, or child kidnapping;
(e) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under
color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or
another's escape from lawful custody;
(f) the homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain;
(g) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to
commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide;
(h) the actor was previously convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the
purpose of this subsection an offense committed in another jurisdiction,
which if committed in Utah would be punishable as aggravated murder or
murder, is considered aggravated murder or murder;
(i) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:
(i) preventing a witness from testifying;
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in
any legal proceedings or official investigation;
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence,
or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or
(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or
enforcement of laws;
(j) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a
candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy;
(k) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer,
executive officer, prosecuting officer,jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge
or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the
victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, and the actor knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the victim holds or has held that official position;
(1) the homicide was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb,
explosive, incendiary device, or similar device which the actor planted,
hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or
mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed, mailed, or
delivered and the actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that his
act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life;
(m) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming
control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats
or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of
the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any other person
aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public conveyance or
otherwise exert control over the public conveyance;
(n) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a
poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a
lethal amount, dosage, or quantity;
(o) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield,
hostage, or for ransom;
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(p) the actor was under a sentence oflife imprisonment or a sentence of
death at the time of the commission of the homicide; or
(q) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious,
cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury
of the victim before death.
(2) Aggravated murder is a capital offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-202; 1975, ch. 53, § 1;
1977,ch.83,§ 1;1983,ch.88,§
12;1983,ch.
93, § 1; 1984, ch. 18, § 5; 1985, ch. 16, § 1;
1991,ch. 10,§ 8; 1994,ch. 149,§ 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "aggravated murder" for "murder in the first degree" in the introductory paragraph
of
Subsection (1) and in Subsection (2), and substituted "aggravated murder, murder" for "first
or second degree murder" several times in Subsection (l)(h) while making stylistic changes
throughout that subsection.

The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "incendiary device" for "infernal
machine" in Subsection (1)(1)and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. - Appeal to Supreme
Court where death sentence imposed, procedure, Rule 26, R. Crim. P.
Jury trial, rights of accused, Utah Const.,
Art. I, § 10; § 77-1-6.
Prosecution for capital felony commenced
any time, § 76-1-301.
Voluntary intoxication not a defense,§ 76-2306.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. - Before 1991, the offenses defined by this section and § 76-5-203
were called "murder in the first degree" and
"murder in the second degree." Many of the
notes below refer to those offenses under their
former names.
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravating circumstances.
-Rape.
Attempted murder.
Cause of death.
Corpus delicti.
Double jeopardy.
Evidence.
-Hypnotically enhanced testimony.
Intent.
-Photographs.
-Sufficient.
Great risk of death to another.
Heinousness.
Homicide by convict.
Instructions.
-Aggravating circumstances.
- Degrees of offense.
-Intent.
-Lesser included offense.
-Self-defense.
Intent.
Intoxication as a defense.
Jury selection.
Killing to prevent testimony.
Lesser included offense.
-Aggravated robbery.

- Depraved indifference murder.
-Theft.
Murder for gain.
Notice of charge.
Other felony.
Prior conviction.
Sentencing.
Two or more persons killed.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Utah's statutory sentencing scheme is constitutional because it has restricted capital homicides to intentional or knowing murders committed under eight aggravating circumstances
which are elements of the crime of first degree
murder, one or more of which must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase of
a capital case. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d
1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
919, 108 S. Ct. 1091, 99 L. Ed. 2d 253, rehearing denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S. Ct. 1491, 99 L.
Ed. 2d 718 (1988).
The Utah death penalty statute imposes no
unconstitutional burden upon defendants in
capital cases. Pierre v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1282
(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033,
107 S. Ct. 1964, 95 L. Ed. 2d 536, rehearing
denied, 483 U.S. 1012, 107 S. Ct. 3246, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 750 (1987).
Subsection (l)(h) does not violate the double
jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. A
person who commits a second intentional homicide is more culpable than one who has not
repeated the act, and it is not unconstitutional
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to make the second intentional homicide a
capital offense. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1989).
Subsection (l)(h) distinguishes between persons with a history of violence and those without such a history; punishing murderers with a
past history of violence more severely than
other murderers is rationally related to the
state's objectives of punishing criminals according to the seriousness of their acts and protecting its citizens from criminal violence. State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).

Aggravating circumstances.
This section allows as aggravating circumstances all felony convictions for violent crimes,
whether committed in Utah or in another state.
The purpose behind the aggravating circumstances requirement is to distinguish those
murders which the legislature feels should be
punished more severely than other murders.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).
-Rape.
Evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of the aggravating circumstances of rape.
See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986).
Attempted murder.
The crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a crime requires
proof of an intent to consummate the crime.
Therefore, it follows that attempted felonymurder does not exist as a crime in Utah. State
v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989).
In order to convict a defendant of attempted
first degree murder, the state had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (i) she had the intent to kill or knowledge
that her acts would result in death if carried
out; (ii) she engaged in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward causing the death of
her husband; and (iii) she did so either (a) by
administering or attempting to administer a
poison or lethal substance or a substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity or (b) for pecuniary or other personal gain.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).
When the charge is attempted first degree
murder, which is distinguishable under Subsection (1) from attempted second degree murder
only by the presence of specified objective aggravating circumstances, the legislature must
have intended that the aggravating circumstance actually be present, so that a subjective
mistake by the actor as to the presence of im
aggravating circumstance required by this section would be a defense to a charge of attempted first degree murder. Under such circumstances, the actor can be convicted only of
an attempted intentional killing - attempted
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second degree murder. State v. Johnson, 821
P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).
Where the jury returned a general verdict of
guilty on each count of attempted first degree
murder, but no special verdicts were given that
would indicate upon which aggravating circumstance the jury based the conviction, because
the court could not determine whether the jury
was unanimous on the elements of the offense
based on Subsection (l)(f) alone, the insufficiency of the evidence to support the state's
proof of the Subsection (l)(n) aggravating circumstance made it impossible for the court to
affirm on the alternative pecuniary gain theory.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).

Cause of death.
As long as there was life in a human being,
extinguishment of it could be homicide, and
where it could not be determined which of
wounds received by decedent caused or contributed to his death, it became a question of fact
for jury to determine. State v. BeBee, 113 Utah
398, 195 P.2d 746 (1948).
Corpus delicti.
The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1) Proof that the victim is actually dead,
and (2) proof that the death was caused by
criminal means. The state must establish the
corpus delicti by clear and convincing evidence.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Aggravating circumstances are not part of
the corpus delicti of first-degree murder. State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Double jeopardy.
Defendant convicted of first degree murder
under Subsection (l)(b) of this section after he
shot to death a man and a woman was not
unconstitutionally put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense by being tried and convicted on
two counts, in one of which the man was the
principal victim and the woman the "other,"
and in the second of which the woman was the
principal victim and the man the other. State v.
Standrod, 547 P.2d 215 (Utah 1976).
Defendant's trial in state court on two counts
of murder after his conviction in federal court
for violating the civil rights of the two murder
victims did not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34
(Utah 1987).
Evidence.
-Hypnotically
enhanced testimony.
Admission of witness's hypnotically enhanced testimony was harmful error, where,
without such testimony, there was a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome would have been
more favorable for defendant, i.e., he might
have been convicted of second degree murder or
some other lesser included offense. State v.
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Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).

Intent.
Defendant's possession of stolen wallet of
deceased, along with evidence that defendant
entered deceased's hotel room with loaded pistol took deceased's wallet from his trousers,
and shot and killed deceased upon deceased's
emergence from bathroom, was sufficient to
sustain inference that defendant had specific
intent to commit robbery, and to sustain conviction offelony murder. State v. Boyland, 27 Utah
2d 268, 495 P.2d 315 (1972).
Evidence that defendant, fearing he would be
arrested for recently committed robbery, drew
and pointed pistol at deputy sheriff who had
stopped in vicinity of defendant's disabled a~tomobile, that defendant shot deputy shenff
five times when deputy attempted to seize the
pistol, and thereafter escaped in the deputy's
car, was sufficient to support conviction of first
degree murder as against defendant's contention that he had no prior intention of killing the
deputy and panicked when latter attempted to
take defendant's pistol from him. State v.
Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 464, 511 P.2d 733 (1973).
Defendant's confession that he killed victim
for his money was sufficient to support finding
that robbery was defendant's motive in killing
victim. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed.
2d 383 (1982).
Evidence was insufficient to prove a specific
intent to kill a peace officer in order to prevent
or avoid arrest, and therefore did not support
defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder, where there were no witnesses
who saw defendant's gun or saw defendant
point the gun at the police officer, no witnesses
saw a muzzle blast, no bullet was found near or
around the spot where the officer was standing
when he heard the gunshot despite fact that
defendant was an expert shot, and there was no
other evidence that the shot heard fired was
fired at the police officer by the defendant.
State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983).
The intent to commit murder need not be
proven by evidence independent of a defendant's confession. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988).
-Photographs.
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
admitting photographs of murder victims, since
the photographs were not particularly bloody or
gruesome and were shown on a large piece of
cardboard in an array that included nonobjectionable photos, thereby greatly minimizing the
challenged photos' visual impact. State v.
Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987).
-Sufficient.
Evidence was sufficient to convict. See State
v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986); State v.

Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987); State v.
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L. Ed.
2d 965 (1990).
Evidence supported the conclusion that the
victim was murdered while defendant was engaged in assaulting the victim's wife, where the
murder and assault were one continuous, interrelated occurrence and it appeared that the
attack that led to the victim's death was in part
undertaken to facilitate the assault on the
victim's wife. State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264
(Utah 1987).
Evidence supported jury's finding of murder
committed for pecuniary or other personal gain
and its finding that defendant employed another person to commit the homicide for remuneration. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah
1989).

Great risk of death to another.
The act creating a great risk of death to a
person other than the victim and the actor
(Subsection (l)(c)) may be directed against a
particular person and need not be directed
against people generally. State v. Pierre, 572
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
Heinousness.
Subsection (l)(q) was inapplicable to the
facts, where, although the victim was stabbed
seven times and may have been conscious for
three or four minutes after infliction of the first
deep stab wound, the record contained no evidence that defendant intended to do or in fact
did anything but kill his victim by stabbing her.
State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1018, 110 S. Ct. 1323, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 498 (1990).
Even though the facts of the case did not
justify consideration of heinousness as an aggravating factor, the trial court could consider
the nature and circumstances of the crime,
including its brutality, as an aggravating factor
at sentencing. State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23 (Utah 1994).
Homicide by convict.
Where evidence warranted it, convict who
killed victim in knife fight while in prison could
be convicted of second degree murder notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a) of this section. State
v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
Instructions.
-Aggravating circumstances.
Although the phrase "you are instructed to
consider" amounted to an improper directed
verdict on an aggravating circumstance, the
subsequent imposition of the death penalty was
supported by three other valid aggravating
factors and the relative lack of mitigating fac-
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tors, which indicated that the jury's verdict
would have been the same without the invalid
aggravator. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 114 S.
Ct. 476, 126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993).

-Degrees of offense.
If evidence did not justify jury to find other
than first degree murder, court need not have
submitted question of second degree murder,
and although it might have done so without
committing error against the accused, it would
have been highly improper. State v. Thorne, 41
Utah 414, 126 P. 286 (1912); State v.
Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 P. 632 (1913).
Trial court should have charged jury with
regard to all degrees of murder in every case
where there was any direct or inferential evidence with respect to the different degrees of
murder; this rule should have been followed
where there was any doubt with regard to
whether or not the higher degree was established. State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 P.
632 (1913).
If defendant had wanted court to give instruction on first degree murder or nothing,
taking his chance on outcome, his position
would have merit only if evidence showed there
could be no offense in between; however, where
defense counsel did not request instruction on
first degree murder or nothing, court did not err
in giving instruction as to second degree murder. State v. Frayer, 17 Utah 2d 288, 409 P.2d
968 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 936, 87 S. Ct.
297, 17 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1966).
Where circumstances surrounding homicide
were such that jury could have viewed facts as
constituting crime of first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter
or voluntary manslaughter, court had to comply
with defendant's requests for instructions on
lesser offenses. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372,
463 P.2d 811 (1970).
Error in instruction to jury on elements of
second degree murder was harmless where jury
was instructed to consider second degree murder only after ascertaining that defendant was
not guilty of first degree murder and jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder; jury
was not duty bound to canvass the second
degree instruction. State v. Murphy, 27 Utah 2d
98, 493 P.2d 617 (1972).
Instructions on first and second degree murder were not improper and prejudicial to one
convicted of first degree murder; considered
together, the instructions clearly specified the
requisite distinctions between the two offenses,
and accused did not except to the challenged
instructions. State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54,
513 P.2d 422 (1973).
-Intent.
Defendant, on trial for first degree murder,
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set up claim that shooting was accidental and
not intentional; failure to instruct that necessary element was intentional shooting was
prejudicial and reversible error. State v.
Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946).
This section requires only that defendant
intentionally cause the death of the victim, not
that defendant formulate the intent to kill the
victim at the time each aggravating act was
committed, and an instruction reflecting this
statutory construction was properly submitted
to the jury. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 114 S.
Ct. 476, 126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993).

-Lesser included offense.
First degree murder embraced all elements
and essentials of second degree, and consisted
of additional elements; where defendant was
charged with first degree murder, giving instructions on second degree murder was proper,
and defendant could not contend that ifhe was
guilty at all he was guilty of first degree murder. State v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362, 237 P. 476
(1925).
Failure to give defendant's requested instruction on second degree felony-murder was prejudicial error where, although the trial court
instructed the jury on the charged offense of
first degree murder - a knowing or intentional
killing committed during the course of an aggravated arson - the jury was never given the
choice of finding that defendant was not responsible for the fire, yet was still guilty of a
felony during which an unintentional killing
occurred, its only choice being to find that he
was responsible for the fire that caused the
death or to acquit him altogether. State v.
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
Trial court properly refused a depraved indifference murder instruction, where the evidence
established that defendant intentionally killed
his victims, and the evidence was not ambiguous or susceptible to alternative interpretations with respect to defendant's intent. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
-Self-defense.
Instructions in both criminal and civil cases
had to be based upon competent, relevant evidence; matters and issues not supported by
evidence could not be submitted to jury; on trial
for first degree murder, theory that defendant
had gun in question for purpose of self-protection, and that it was accidentally discharged,
thus reducing his guilt to involuntary manslaughter, could not be submitted to jury where
there was no evidence introduced to justify
such an instruction. State v. Thompson, 110
Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946).
Conviction of murder in first degree for homicide growing out of forcible ejection of defendant from beer parlor by peace officer not in
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uniform was proper against claim of self-defense where defendant shot two potentially
fatal shots at deceased and instructions to jury
on self-defense required both shots to be justified by defendant's fear of serious bodily harm.
State v. BeBee, 113 Utah 398, 195 P.2d 746
(1948).

Intent.
There is no difference between the intent
required as an element of the crime of attempted aggravated murder and that required
for aggravated murder itself. State v. Maestas,
652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982).
The intent required to commit attempted
aggravated murder is the same intent as that
required to commit the murder itself an_dmay
be inferred from defendant's conduct and the
surrounding circumstances. State v. Collier,
736 P.2d 231 (Utah 1987).
Intoxication as a defense.
Evidence that defendant had been drinking
did not provide a defense to a first degree
murder charge alleging the murder was committed during a robbery; to establish voluntary
intoxication as a defense to such charge, it was
necessary to show defendant's mind had been
affected to such an extent that he did not have
the capacity to form the requisite specific intent
or purpose, prior to the murder, to commit
robbery. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed.
2d 383 (1982).
If voluntary intoxication is so great as to
negate the existence of a necessary specific
intent for aggravated murder, the crime is
reduced to murder. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71
(Utah), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct.
341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction of
attempted first degree murder notwithstanding
stipulated evidence that his blood alcohol level
was .203 after the event, where he was aware of
his surroundings and was able to understand
and a~swer questions, and he exhibited speed,
dexterity, and strength in fleeing from the
scene of the crime. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135 (Utah 1989).
Jury selection.
In first-degree murder trial where jury recommended life imprisonment, elimination of
persons conscientiously opposed to death penalty from jury was not denial of due process and
equal protection. Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d
1158 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1048, 92 S. Ct. 1329, 31 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1972).
Killing to prevent testimony.
State is not required to prove that a victim
alle~edly killed to prevent him from testifying
agamst defendant in another homicide case
would have been a competent witness; such

requirement would emasculate the statute because it cannot be known whether a witness is
competent until he is called to testify. State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980).

Lesser included offense.
-Aggravated robbery.
Under the test for separateness found in
§ 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery becomes a
lesser included offense of first degree felony
murder where the predicate felony for first
degree murder is aggravated robbery. State v.
Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
-Depraved indifference murder.
Depraved indifference murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
-Theft.
Where the taking of personal property established the crime of theft and provided an element of aggravated robbery and, to the extent
that aggravated robbery served as the aggravating circumstance, first degree murder, the
statutory element of taking personal property
is common to both theft and first degree murder, making theft a lesser included offense of
first degree murder. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d
1301 (Utah 1986).
A conviction for theft did not merge with a
conviction for first degree murder because evidence at the trial was sufficient to prove the
crime of murder in the first degree without
relying on the theft conviction as the aggravating circumstance required for the murder conviction. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah
1993).
Murder for gain.
Where the jury convicted the defendant of
aggravated robbery as a separate offense, the
appellate court could uphold the jury's verdict
on first degree murder under the robbery alternative, without addressing the constitutional
adequacy of the "other personal gain" alternative of this section. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d
1301 (Utah 1986).
Defendant's contention that he was prejudiced in the penalty phase, on the grounds that
the vagueness of "other personal gain" results
in an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty, in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, was rejected since the
defendant did not receive the death penalty.
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
In order to be convicted of first-degree murder under Subsection (l)(f) a defendant must
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of
another person with the intent to gain personally or pecuniarily. The fact that a defendant
does not so gain is irrelevant; it is the intent
and belief which controls. State v. Schreuder,
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726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986).
Evidence indicating that defendant believed
that she would inherit under her father's will
and that she had him murdered to get that
inheritance was sufficient to convict defendant
of first degree murder, notwithstanding the fact
that defendant misapprehended the terms of
the will, which gave everything to the victim's
widow.State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah
1986).

Notice of charge.
The aggravating circumstances set forth in
this section are adequate notice to one charged
with a capital felony of what the state must
prove so that the defendant is able to prepare
his defense. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816
(Utah), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S. Ct.
254, 66 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1980).
Other felony.
A defendant commits first-degree murder if
the murder is committed knowingly or intentionally in conjunction with the commission of
any one of several enumerated felonies,
whether the felony is an integral part of, or
merely incidental to, the murder. State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), cert. denied,
Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706,
126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
Prior conviction.
Under Subsection (l)(h), the jury is not initially to be presented with mention or evidence
of defendant's prior conviction. If the jury finds
him guilty of an intentional and knowing killing, it may then be instructed on the prior
conviction if the trial court determines that it
qualifies under the subsection. The jury should
then return to deliberate the existence or nonexistence of the prior conviction, which will, in
turn, determine whether the homicide is first or
second degree murder. State v. James, 767 P.2d
549 (Utah 1989).
Admission of two of defendant's prior convictions in the guilt phase of the trial was not
unfairly prejudicial, where, after the aggravating circumstance required by Subsection (l)(h)
was proven by entering into evidence copies of
defendant's commitments to the Utah State
Prison on robbery charges, no attempt was
made to try defendant on the basis of his "bad
character." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah
1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 110 S. Ct.
1837, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).
Trial court did not err in refusing to order the
state to accept defendant's profferred stipulation regarding his prior convictions of assault,
because the state had the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had
previously been convicted of"a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to a person" under
Subsection (l)(h). State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452
(Utah 1989).
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Admission of defendant's prior convictions
pursuant to Subsection (l)(h) in the guilt phase
of the trial was prejudicial error, where there
was sufficient evidence to support his manslaughter theory and the jury was allowed to
consider evidence of his prior convictions before
determining his culpable mental state. State v.
Florez, 777 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989).

Sentencing.
Where defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death after the
jury was instructed that there is no fixed standard as to the degree of persuasion needed for a
particular sentence, and the Utah Supreme
Court subsequently established a new rule,
while the defendant's appeal was pending, imposing a "reasonable doubt" standard for a
penalty hearing in a capital case, the defendant
was entitled to the benefit of the new rule and
was granted a new sentencing hearing. State v.
Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 942, 104 S. Ct. 1923, 80 L. Ed. 2d 470
(1984).
The Legislature has defined and proscribed a
single offense in this section, the intentional or
knowing killing of an individual in connection
with one or more aggravating circumstances.
There is no evidence that the Legislature intended to expose defendants to multiple punishments. Therefore, a single punishment was
envisioned for a violation of the statute. State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), cert. denied,
Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706,
126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality
review was not required in regard to defendant's contention that his sentence of death
was disproportionate to the crime committed,
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the
sentences meted out in other first-degree murder cases. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987), cert. denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
Where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury was instructed disjunctively as to the alternative evaluating circumstances aggravating the offense, jury
unanimity on the evaluating circumstances
was not required, the record having shown
substantial evidence to support all of the alternatives set forth in the instructions. State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), cert. denied,
Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706,
126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
The sentencing body may not rely on other
violent criminal activity as an aggravating factor supporting a death penalty unless it is first
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did commit the other crime. State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), aff'd on
reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus granted and judgment vacated,
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Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1942, 118 L.
Ed. 2d 548 (1992).
The state not only has the burden of persuading the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt
that the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the mitigating
circumstances, but also has the burden of proving to the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant actually committed the violent crime which is to be treated as an aggravating factor. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988), aff'd on reconsideration, 776 P.2d
631 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus granted and
judgment vacated, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
112 S. Ct. 1942, 118 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1992).
Erroneous instruction on Subsection (l)(q)
necessitated remand for new sentencing, because the failure to instruct the jury properly
during the guilt phase permitted them to find
the existence of the Subsection (l)(q) aggravating circumstance and then to consider that
erroneous finding when determining the penalty. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989).
In the penalty phase, the sentencer may
consider any relevant facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty; inclusion of a particular aggravating factor in this section is not a
prerequisite for consideration by the sentencing body. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah
1994).
In sentencing defendant for first degree murder, including both the robbery-murder factor
and the pecuniary-gain factor on the special
verdict form unfairly divided a single act of the

defendant, aggravated robbery, into two aggravating factors; jury instructions or special verdict forms which contain either of the two
murder-robbery factors in Subsection (l)(d)
should not contain the pecuniary-gain factor as
well. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah
1994).
Even though defendant's death sentence under Subsection (l)(q) in an earlier trial was
reversed due to faulty jury instructions, it was
not error for the trial court to permit the jury to
consider the allegedly heinous nature of the
murder in a second sentencing proceeding.
State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah
1994).

Two or more persons killed.
The definition of "criminal episode" in Subsection (l)(b) does not require that the criminal
objective be murder. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d
450 (Utah 1994).
There is no requirement that a defendant kill
the "two or more" persons referred to in Subsection (l)(b) or that a defendant kill one person
and be a party to the murder of the others. The
killings must occur during one act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode, but the
defendant need only be responsible for one of
them. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah
1994).
Cited in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473
1987); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275
1989); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030
1991); Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211
1993).
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cases, 64 A.L.R.4th 755.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that in committing murder, defendant created risk of death or injury to more
than one person, to many persons, and the like
- post-Gregg cases, 64 A.L.R.4th 837.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant was previously convicted of or committed other violent offense,
had history of violent conduct, posed continuing
threat to society, and the like - post-Gregg
cases, 65 A.L.R.4th 838.
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Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was committed for pecuniary gain, as consideration or in expectation
of receiving something of monetary value, and
the like - post-Gregg cases, 66 A.L.R.4th 417.
Sufficiency of evidence, for death penalty
purposes, to establish statutory aggravating
circumstance that murder was committed in
course of committing, attempting, or fleeing
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from other offense, and the like - post-Gregg
cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 887.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant committed murder
while under sentence of imprisonment, in confinement or correctional custody, and the like post-Gregg cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 942.
Application of felony-murder doctrine where
person killed was co-felon, 89 A.L.R.4th 683.

Murder.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated robbery,
robbery, rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, child kidnapping, rape of a child, object rape of a
child, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection
76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age, causes the
death of another person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202;
or
(e) causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or
attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer as defined in Section 76-5102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest as
defined in Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace
officer.
(2) Murder is a first degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-203; 1975, ch. 53, § 2;
1977, ch. 83, § 2; 1979, ch. 74, § 1; 1986, ch.
157, § 1; 1990, ch. 227, § 1; 1991, ch. 10, § 9.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, deleted "in the

second degree" following "murder" in the introductory language of Subsection (1) and substituted the present language of Subsection (2) for
"Murder in the second degree is a felony of the
first degree."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. - Before 1991, the offenses defined by § 76-5-202 and this section
were called "murder in the first degree" and
"murder in the second degree." Many of the
notes below refer to those offenses under their
former names.

ANALYSIS

Attempt.
Burden of proof.
-Intent.
Circumstantial evidence.
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Attempt.
The crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a crime requires
proof of an intent to consummate the crime.
Therefore, it follows that attempted felonymurder does not exist as a crime in Utah. State
v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989).
A defendant may not be prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the depraved indifference alternative of Subsection
(l)(c) of this section; Utah does not recognize
attempted depraved indifference homicide.
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992); State v.
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
Proof of the "knowing" mental state required
for depraved indifference homicide under Subsection (l)(c) of this section is not sufficient to
satisfy the mental state required by the attempt statute, § 76-4-101. State v. Vigil, 842
P.2d 843 (Utah 1992).
Burden of proof.
-Intent.
Because intent is an element of the offense
under this section, the state must carry the
burden of proving the defendant's intent. This
intent need not be proved by direct evidence,
but may be inferred from the defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances. State v.
Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of murder in
the second degree. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d
723 (Utah 1982).
Circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence
that placed defendants as participants at the
scene at the time of the killing and placed the
murder weapons in their possession was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v.

Depraved indifference.
In a prosecution for second degree murder,
although the court's jury instruction did not
expressly treat the element of knowledge, there
was no error since the other jury instructions
and the evidence of the defendant's actions left
little room for the jury to misunderstand that
the defendant must have been aware that his
conduct created a grave risk of death to another, within the definitions contained in the
instructions. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1984).
Although the defendant pulled a cord around
the victim's neck during intercourse, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that
the defendant "evidenced a depraved indifference to human life" in the conduct which caused
the victim's death, but it was sufficient to
support a conviction for the included offense of
manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(Utah 1985).
Depraved indifference murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Trial court properly refused a depraved indifference murder instruction, where the evidence
established that defendant intentionally killed
his victims, and the evidence was not ambiguous or susceptible to alternative interpretations with respect to defendant's intent. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
-Elements.
The jury should be instructed that to convict
of depraved indifference murder it must find (1)
that the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave, (4)
which means a highly likely probability of
death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced an
utter callousness and indifference toward human life. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254
(Utah 1988).
A jury instruction defining "depraved indifference" that was similar to the instruction
disapproved in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254
(1988), and which did not set out the five
elements required to convict of depraved indifference murder as enumerated in Standiford
fell short of the standard established in that
case, but defendant had not objected to the
instruction nor submitted a different instruction and there was no manifest injustice or
plain error. State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah
1994).
-Standard.
The term "depraved indifference to human
life" does not refer to the mens rea, or subjective
culpable mental state, of depraved murder, but
rather to an objective reasonable person standard as to the value of human life. Thus, the
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element of depraved indifference must be based
on an objective evaluation of the magnitude of
the risk created and of all the circumstances
surrounding the killing. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

Evidence.
In prosecution for murder, evidence that defendant was among strikers and was shooting
toward train carrying workers to mine sustained his conviction for second degree murder.
State v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362, 237 P. 476 (1925).
That defendant's "heat of passion" was sustained for two and one-half hours, that cause of
death by strangulation contradicted defendant's testimony that his wife was alive when
he departed to call an ambulance, that magnitude of wife's injuries seriously undermined
defendant's account of alleged altercation, and
that basis for alleged provocation appeared
insufficient to render an ordinary man of average disposition liable to act irrationally and
without due deliberation and reflection constituted substantial evidence from which jury
could reasonably infer a purpose and design on
defendant's part to take unlawfully the life of
his wife, and sustain conviction of murder in
second degree as opposed to manslaughter.
State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632
(1972).
Evidence that defendant met with victim on
the street on the evening she disappeared, that
he left the state to visit his sister the day
followingvictim's disappearance, that he made
statements describing a strange dream he had
in which he may have hurt or killed a girl, and
statement made two years after the disappearance that he once had a fight with a girl in Utah
was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the victim's death,
and even if it proved he caused her death, it
was insufficient to establish that he did so
intentionally or knowingly as charged in the
complaint for second degree murder. State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's threatening statements and conduct immediately before the fight, kicking the
victim in the head, and entering into the fight
with knife in hand are facts sufficient to support a finding that defendant either intended to
kill the victim or intended to cause "serious
bodily injury" while acting in a manner clearly
dangerous to human life, or that defendant
knowingly participated in conduct which created a grave risk of death, while evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life. State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder convictions,
where he was heard telling his neighbors "If I
don't start getting some answers, I am going to
start blowing everybody away" just prior to
shooting two of them with a gun which required
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a hammer-cock before it could be fired. State v.
Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987).
Evidence that a child was fatally injured
while under the defendant's sole care and custody was sufficient to support the inference that
the defendant, in inflicting the injury, acted
with the requisite mental state described in
this section. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah
1988).
In order to convict defendant of attempted
murder under this statute, the state must have
adduced evidence that would have allowed the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause victim's death. State v.
Dumas, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
Evidence, including expert testimony, that
the victim was "brain dead," was sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the injuries to the victim's head, not removal of hospital
life support systems, were the proximate cause
of the victim's death. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d
449 (Utah 1986).
Even if life support systems had been removed prematurely from the victim, who was
deemed "brain dead" under accepted medical
standards, defendant would still be responsible
for the victim's death since intervening medical
error is not a defense to a defendant who has
inflicted a mortal wound upon another. State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986).
Erroneous admission of six-minute portion of
videotape that lingered on victim's body and
wounds did not necessitate reversal of defendant's conviction, because defendant, by failing
to object to the admission of gruesome still
photographs, undermined his claim that the
improper introduction of the videotape was
harmful error. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221
(1989).
There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction, where defendant, along
with three other men, entered the victim's
trailer and defendant remained inside, preventing the victim's roommate from assisting
the victim, while the other men forced the
victim outside and beat him to death. State v.
Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Felony murder.
The Legislature did not intend the multiple
crimes comprising felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather that the
homicide be enhanced to felony murder in addition to the underlying felony. Allowing punishment for both felony murder and the underlying felony does not violate the double
jeopardy principles of the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution, Article I, Sec.
12 of the Utah State Constitution, nor § 76-1402(3). State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah
1990).
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Gravamen of offense.
The gravamen of the offense of murder in the
second degree is the intentional killing of a
human being without the exceptions set out
under the manslaughter statute. Farrow v.
Smith, 541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975).
Included offenses.
Attempted manslaughter is an included offense under a charge of attempted criminal
homicide. State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah
1978).
Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
second degree murder. State v. Day, 815 P.2d
1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Instructions.
"Depraved indifference to human life" are
nontechnical words whose understanding by
jurors is presumed, and failure by court to give
an instruction on such words, when not requested, is not error. State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703
(Utah 1977).
In second degree murder case against defendant based upon circumstantial evidence, jury
instruction that adequately conveyed the concept of care or caution in the consideration of
circumstantial evidence was not defective although it did not contain the precise wording
that circumstantial evidence should be treated
with "caution." State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723
(Utah 1982).
In case of second degree murder conviction
arising from death resulting from arson, it was
proper for court to deny defendant's request for
jury instruction involving hypothetical scenario
where intervening force breaks chain of causation, since instruction was not sufficiently relevant to situation where victim may have gone
back into burning building to retrieve belongings. State v. Dronzank, 671 P.2d 199 (Utah
1983).
Failure to give defendant's requested instruction on second degree felony-murder was prejudicial error where, although the trial court
instructed the jury on the charged offense of
first degree murder,- a knowing or intentional
killing committed during the course of an aggravated arson - the jury was never given the
choice of finding that defendant was not responsible for the fire, yet was still guilty of a
felony during which an unintentional killing
occurred, its only choice being to find that he
was responsible for the fire that caused the
death or to acquit him altogether. State v.
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
Defendant, who was convicted of second-degree murder after the jury was instructed on
the alternative theories set out in Subsections
(l)(a), (l)(b), and (l)(c), was not deprived of his
right to a unanimous jury verdict under Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 10, when the trial court
refused to give his requested instruction that

the jury had to agree unanimously upon one of
the three theories as the basis for its verdict.
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987).

-Lesser included offense.
Trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury on the offense of aggravated assault at
defendant's trial for second-degree murder, as
the evidence would not support both an acquittal on the murder charge and a conviction on
the aggravated assault charge. State v. Velarde,
734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986).
Refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on aggravated assault at his trial for
second-degree murder was reversible error, because the jury needed to determine whether the
defendant lacked the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, which would permit an
acquittal on the murder charge while allowing
a conviction on the aggravated assault charge.
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986).
Trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct
the jury on negligent homicide at defendant's
trial for second-degree murder, where the evidence showing his participation in a fatal beating was not ambiguous or susceptible to alternative interpretations that would have made it
possible for the jury to acquit him of seconddegree murder and convict him of negligent
homicide. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah
1986).
Intent inferable.
Defendant's belligerent behavior, his use of
vulgar, abusive, and threatening language to
arresting officer, his destruction of police radio
while in patrolman's automobile, his threatened harm to officer's wife and daughter, and
threat to kill the officer provided sufficient
evidence from which jury could conclude that
defendant's act in beating to death defendant's
cellmate shortly after defendant's arrest were
committed either with intent to kill the victim
or with intent to do such great bodily harm to
the victim that death was likely to result and
justified a verdict of second degree murder.
State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029
(1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992, 94 S. Ct.
2403, 40 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974).
Although ordinarily an assault with hands or
feet does not imply an intent to kill, this is not
an absolute rule, and when such an assault
causes death and is attended by circumstances
of violence, excessive force or brutality, malice
may be inferred, in which case the evidence
may support a conviction under this section.
State v. Warclle, 564 P.2d 764 (Utah 1976).
Where defendant was convicted of seconddegree murder for the death of a 14-month-old
child, it was not necessary to prove directly that
defendant had an intent to kill, but rather it
was only necessary to prove that he intentionally struck the child in such a way that the
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natural result would be the child's death. State
v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983).

Intentionally or knowingly causing death.
Evidence that defendant stabbed victim
three times and then raped victim's female
companion instead of aiding the dying victim
was sufficient to establish that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim's
death. State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah
1977).
Intent to cause serious bodily injury.
Brutality of murder of convict who was
stabbed ten times by four weapons was not
inconsistent with finding that defendant intended only to cause serious bodily injury so as
to be guilty of second degree, rather than first
degree, murder where there was no evidence to
indicate defendant used more than one knife.
State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
Jury unanimity.
A jury does not have to be unanimous in
deciding which of the culpable mental states it
finds in convicting of second-degree murder, as
long as the jurors find unanimously that one or
another form of second-degree murder was
committed. State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah
1987); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah
1988); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah
1994); State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah
1994).
Killing in perpetration of felony.
Where act of sodomy was committed with
deceased's neck so bound that it prevented a
return flow of blood from his head, trial court
did not err in giving jury instruction on felony
murder in second degree; death resulted from
felony greatly dangerous to lives of others and
evidencing depraved mind without regard for
human life, which would have constituted murder at common law. State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d
255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970).
"Malice aforethought" rejected.
The culpable mental states included in the
second-degree murder statute are (1) an intent
to kill, (2) an intent to inflict serious bodily
harm, (3) conduct knowingly engaged in and
evidencing a depraved indifference to human
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life, and (4) intent to commit a felony other
than murder. The term "malice aforethought" is
a confusing carry-over from prior law and
should no longer be used. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).
Trial court properly refused to give defendant's requested "malice aforethought" instruction. State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah
1989).

Party to felony.
In the phrase "another person other than a
party" in Subsection (l)(d), "party" means a
co-participant in the felony that is the subject of
the subsection, and does not mean a victim of
the felony. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986).
Reckless conduct.
Reckless conduct is not sufficient to prove the
offense of murder in the second degree. State v.
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
When offense should be charged.
Ifit appears that the elements of first degree
murder are lacking and that there are no exceptions of manslaughter involved, then upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal
homicide was perpetrated, the verdict should
be murder in the second degree. Farrow v.
Smith, 541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975).
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986); State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115 (Utah 1987);
State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987); State
v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 995 (Utah 1987); State
v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (1989); Lancaster
v. Cook, 780 P.2d 1246 (1989); State v.
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v.
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1991); Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Allen, 839 P.2d
291 (Utah 1992); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293
(Utah 1992); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201
(Utah 1993); State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50
(Utah 1993); State v. Labrum, 246 Utah Adv.
Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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Death of other than intended victim no defense.

In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the actor caused the
death of a person other than the intended victim shall not constitute a defense
for any purpose to criminal homicide.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-204, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-204.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 39.
Key Numbers. - Homicide <S=>17.
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Manslaughter.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or
(b) causes the death of another under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;
or
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where the actor
reasonably believes the circumstances provide a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally justifiable or
excusable under the existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance does not include a
condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (l)(b),
or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances.
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-205, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-205; 1975, ch. 53, § 3;
1985, ch. 177, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attempted manslaughter.
Defenses.
- Intervening medical error.
Elements of offense.
Emotional disturbance.
Evidence.
- Directed verdict improper.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
Mental state.
- Reckless disregard.
Self-defense.
Sufficiency of information.

Voluntary intoxication.
Cited.

Attempted manslaughter.
There cannot be an attempt to commit manslaughter under Subsection (l)(a), which provides that criminal homicide is manslaughter if
the actor recklessly causes death, but there can
be an attempt to commit manslaughter under
Subsection (l)(b), which makes criminal homicide manslaughter if the actor causes death
while under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse. State v.
Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978).
There is a crime of attempted manslaughter
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under Subsection (l)(c). State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982).

Defenses.
-Intervening medical error.
Defendant was precluded from claiming intervening medical error as a defense, where the
state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
snakebite, not subsequent medical treatment,
was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim, who died after being bitten by a rattlesnake placed on her shoulders by defendant.
State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989).
Elements of offense.
For cases discussing voluntary and involuntary manslaughter under former Penal Code,
including provocation, heat of passion, and intent, see People v. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 P. 902
(1888), rev'd on another point, 130 U.S. 83, 9 S.
Ct. 435, 32 L. Ed. 870 (1889); State v. Green, 78
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931); State v. Cobo, 90
Utah 89, 97, 60 P.2d 952 (1936); State v.
Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 P.2d 176 (1937);
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738
(1947); State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P.2d
457 (1939); State v. Barker, 113 Utah 514, 196
P.2d 723 (1948).
Emotional disturbance.
For cases discussing killing to prevent defilement offemale relative under former justifiable
homicide statute, see People v. Halliday, 5 Utah
467, 17 P. 118 (1888); State v. Botha, 27 Utah
289, 75 P. 731 (1903); State v. Williams, 49 Utah
320, 163 P. 1104 (1916); State v. Besares, 75
Utah 141, 283 P. 738 (1929).
"Extreme emotional disturbance" as used in
Subsection (l)(b) of this section is not a term of
art deriving its meaning from usage, but is to
be understood in its common everyday sense.
State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
Some external initiating circumstance must
bring about the disturbance described in Subsection (l)(b), and use of the phrase "triggered
by an external event" in an instruction to the
jury is therefore not error. State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Evidence.
In prosecution of striker for murder of fireman on train carrying strikebreakers
and
armed guards to mine, when train was assaulted by band of strikers, evidence supported
conviction of defendant for voluntary manslaughter. State v. Pagialakis, 65 Utah 552, 238
P. 256 (1925).
In prosecution of hit-and-run driver for involuntary manslaughter of two youths who were
changing tire when hit, evidence including defendant's testimony that he had "subconscious"
feeling that he had hit something warranted
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submission of case to jury and sustained its
guilty verdict. State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah
357, 68 P.2d 176 (1937).
Admission of evidence concerning revocation
of defendant's driver's license, in prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter, was error, in
view of fact that driving without license, or
after it had been revoked, was offense malum
prohibitum that was not foundation for an
involuntary manslaughter charge. State v. Peterson, 116 Utah 362, 210 P.2d 229 (1949).
Autopsy evidence that baby had subdural
hematoma and fractured ribs did not support
conviction of parents for involuntary manslaughter in absence of evidence of any act or
omission on part of parents or any marked
disregard for baby's safety that contributed to
her death. State v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 495
P.2d 318 (1972).
Conviction for manslaughter may be based
entirely upon circumstantial evidence. State v.
John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978).

-Directed verdict improper.
On evidence that defendant, driving at night
at excessive speed, veered to right and struck
group of pedestrians walking on gravel shoulder of highway, trial court erred in granting
defendant's motion for directed verdict and
dismissal of charge of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d
258 (1945).
Included offense.
Voluntary manslaughter was not necessarily
included in first degree murder. State v.
Mitchell, 3 Utah 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955).
Attempted manslaughter is an included offense under a charge of attempted criminal
homicide under Section 76-5-203. State v.
Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978).
Negligent homicide is an included offense
under a charge of manslaughter. State v. Dyer,
671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983).
Although defendant pulled a cord around the
victim's neck during intercourse, the evidence
was insufficient to support a conviction of second degree murder based on depravity in the
conduct of the defendant that caused the victim's death, but it was sufficient to support a
conviction for the included offense of manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(Utah 1985).
Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
second degree murder. State v. Day, 815 P.2d
1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
There was no rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of manslaughter and
convicting him of negligent homicide, when the
only issue relevant to the choice was defendant's awareness of the risk of death, and any
absence of awareness could only have been due
to voluntary intoxication, making unawareness
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immaterial under§ 76-2-306. State v. Day, 815
P.2d 1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Indictment or information.
In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter,
wherein it appeared that homicide was result of
automobile accident, information that, in addition to alleging that automobile was driven
negligently, recklessly, wantonly, willfully, and
unlawfully, charged that automobile was so
driven by defendant "without observing the
course the said automobile was taking to see if
the said course was obstructed or about to be
obstructed by any persons or other obstacles, so
as to endanger the life and limb of persons
being then and there upon said public highway
as aforesaid, to-wit, at a rate of speed in excess
of 25 miles an hour," was sufficient. State v.
Lake, 57 Utah 619, 196 P. 1015 (1921).
Information alleging that accused "then and
there, without due caution and circumspection,
recklessly, willfully, and unlawfully, at said
time and place, did drive said automobile in a
reckless manner," specifying the acts constituting reckless, willful, and unlawful driving or
operation of the automobile, sufficiently
charged manslaughter by automobile. State v.
Assenberg, 66 Utah 573, 244 P. 1027 (1926).

nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil
action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).
Defendant's conviction of manslaughter was
affirmed, because he was aware that there was
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death in
his act of placing a rattlesnake on the shoulders
of the victim, a two-year-old child. State v.
Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989).
Evidence that defendant had struck infant,
along with fact that defendant must have
known that continually striking a three-monthold infant with adult force created a substantial
risk of severe injury or death, was sufficient to
show that the defendant possessed the necessary intent to support a manslaughter conviction. State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).

-Reckless disregard.
For discussion of reckless disregard for the
safety of others under former negligent homicide by automobile statute, § 41-6-43.10, see
State v. Berch told, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183
(1960).
Self-defense.
Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction
for manslaughter where self-defense at issue.
See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).

Instructions.
Where circumstances surrounding homicide
were such that jury could have viewed facts as
constituting crime of first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter
or voluntary manslaughter, defendant's requests for instructions on offenses lesser than
first degree murder to jury should have been
granted. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463
P.2d 811 (1970).
In a prosecution for second degree murder,
the jury was instructed on the elements of
murder in the second degree, manslaughter,
and negligent homicide in language directly
borrowed from the statute, gainsaying the defendant's contention that no consideration was
given to the instructions on manslaughter and
negligent homicide. State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566
(Utah 1983).

Voluntary intoxication.
Evidence of an alleged "alcoholic blackout" is
inadmissible as a defense to a manslaughter
charge, since the requisite mens rea of a manslaughter charge is recklessness, and voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to a crime based on
reckless acts. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257
(Utah 1985).

Mental state.
The sole difference between reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide is whether
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death
or simply was not, but should have been, aware
of it. In both cases, a defendant's conduct must
be a "gross deviation" from the standard of care
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-

Cited in State v. Michalcewicz, 712 P.2d 253
(Utah 1985); State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 256
(Utah 1985); State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395
(Utah 1986); State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329
(Utah 1989); State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459
(Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201
(Utah 1993).

Sufficiency of information.
State was not required to specify in information under which subdivision of Subsection (1)
it desired to proceed; information charging an
offense under all three subdivisions was sufficient. State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136 (Utah
1977).
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homicide.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-206, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-206.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant
physician's trial for negligent homicide involving the death of an infant after a premature
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
Evidence.
- Expert testimony.
-Mitigating circumstances.
-Sufficient.
Instructions.
Jury question.
Manslaughter.
-Negligent homicide as included offense.
Negligence.
Pleas and defenses.
Self-defense.
-Burden of proof.
-Evidence sufficient.
Cited.

Criminal negligence.
For cases discussing criminal negligence as
element of former offense of involuntary manslaughter, see State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180,
91 P.2d 457 (1939); State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah
63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945); State v. Olsen, 108
Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427 (1945); State v. Riddle,
112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948); State v.
Barker, 113 Utah 514, 196 P.2d 723 (1948).
The bending down of a stop sign at an intersection so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
335 (Utah 1980).
State v. Hallett, 619 j=>.2d
Evidence.
-Expert testimony.
While expert testimony is not required to
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant
accused of homicide, expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden,
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).

-Mitigating circumstances.
At defendant's trial for negligent homicide
because he ran a red light and was involved in
an intersection collision, he should have been
allowed to introduce evidence of other similar
accidents occurring at the same intersection,
and •the city traffic engineer, as an expert,
should have been permitted to testify as to the
lenses in the semaphore signal and their tendency to cause "sun phantom." State v. Stewart,
12 Utah 2d 273, 365 P.2d 785 (1961).
-SlU'ficient.
Evidence showing that from the length of
defendant's skid marks the police estimated his
speed to have been 55 to 65 miles per hour at
the time his auto struck and killed a pedestrian
in a 35-mile-per-hour zone, and that the defendant was familiar with the area and should
have realized that people might be crossing the
highway there, was sufficient for trial court to
find defendant guilty of negligent homicide.
State v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 404 P.2d 677
(1965) (decided under former§ 41-6-43.10).
Evidence showing that defendant knew of
stop sign and restricted view at intersection
where the collision occurred, and that, whether
or not defendant ran the stop sign, he was
traveling over forty miles per hour when he
reached the point of impact, and that the two
vehicles were so close together when defendant
entered the intersection that the driver of the
other auto had no opportunity to apply her
brakes prior to the collision was sufficient to
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show conduct evincing a reckless disregard for
the safety of others. State v. Selman, 18 Utah
2d 199, 417 P.2d 975 (1966) (decided under
former§ 41-6-43.10, negligent homicide by automobile).
Evidence that doctor's treatment of premature infant created a risk of such a nature and
degree that the doctor should have perceived it
and that his failure to perceive the risk constituted a gross deviation from the appropriate
standard of care was sufficient to support conviction under this section for infant's death.
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).

Instructions.
For cases involving jury instructions on former offense of involuntary manslaughter, see
State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 P.2d 176
(1937); State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P.2d
457 (1939); State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113,
170 P.2d 153 (1946); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah
130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. McQuilkin,
113 Utah 268, 193 P.2d 433 (1948); State v.
Barker, 113 Utah 514, 196 P.2d 723 (1948);
State v. Peterson, 116 Utah 362, 210 P.2d 229
(1949); State v. Wilson, 117 Utah 368, 216 P.2d
630 (1950); State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102,
396 P.2d 414 (1964); State v. Lancaster, 20 Utah
2d 80, 433 P.2d 312 (1967).
In manslaughter prosecution, negligent homicide instruction was not supported by evidence that defendant fired shotgun at intended
victim but hit another man who stepped into
the line of fire at the last second; question is
defendant's subjective state of mind as to the
intended victim, not the actual victim. State v.
Howard, 597 P.2d 878 (Utah 1979).
In second degree murder prosecution, negligent homicide instruction was not supported by
evidence that defendant fired shotgun at man
who was heading towards door by which stood a
rifle, after the two had argued. State v. Howard,
597 P.2d 878 (Utah 1979).
In homicide prosecution of defendant who
shot and killed an unarmed person who was
leaning against defendant's car, evidence would
not support jury instructions concerning "imminent use of unlawful force" by decedent or
threat of "death or serious bodily injury'' by
decedent, nor would it support instruction concerning one's right to use of force "other than
deadly force" in defense of one's personal property. State v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472 (Utah 1979).
Where defendant was tried for the shooting
death of his wife, there was no evidence to
support a verdict of negligent homicide, and
defendant was not entitled to an instruction on
negligent homicide, where defendant, aware of
the risk involved in his act, pointed and fired a
gun, which he thought was unloaded, at his
wife thereby killing her; under such circumstances, defendant was properly convicted of

manslaughter. Boggess v. State, 655 P.2d 654
(Utah 1982).
In prosecution for second degree murder, the
jury was instructed on the elements of murder
in the second degree, manslaughter, and negligent homicide in language directly borrowed
from the statute, gainsaying the defendant's
contention that no consideration was given to
the instructions on manslaughter and negligent homicide. State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566
(Utah 1983).
Trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct
the jury on negligent homicide at defendant's
trial for second-degree murder, where the evidence showing his participation in a fatal beating was not ambiguous or susceptible to alternative interpretations which would have made
it possible for the jury to acquit him of seconddegree murder and convict him of negligent
homicide. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah
1986).

Jury question.
In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter,
where homicide was result of automobile accident, whether defendant kept proper lookout
and observed course his automobile was taking
so as to avoid collision was a question for the
jury. State v. Lake, 57 Utah 619, 196 P. 1015
(1921).
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution
arising out of automobile accident, jury could
have found that, by reason of defendant's intoxicated condition, he had failed to react in normal manner to situation which confronted him,
and that his conduct was responsible cause of
collision and resulting death. State v.
McQuilkin, 113 Utah 268, 193 P.2d 433 (1948).
Conflicting evidence as to defendant's negligence presented jury question, unless reasonable minds could have arrived at no conclusion
other than that there was no criminal negligence. State v. Read, 121 Utah 453, 243 P.2d
439 (1953).
Manslaughter.
-Negligent
homicide as included offense.
Negligent homicide is an included offense
under a charge of manslaughter. State v. Dyer,
671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983).
There was no rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of manslaughter and
convicting him of negligent homicide, when the
only issue relevant to the choice was defendant's awareness of the risk of death, and any
absence of awareness could only have been due
to voluntary intoxication, making unawareness
immaterial under § 76-2-306. State v. Day, 815
P.2d 1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Negligence.
Mere negligence was not sufficient to authorize verdict of manslaughter. State v. Adamson,
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101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942).

Pleas and defenses.
Acquittal under former§ 57-7-102 for failure
to report automobile accident was not bar to
prosecution for manslaughter. State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 P. 762 (1924).
Self-defense.
-Burden of proof.
The state was not required to prove the
absence of self-defense as one of the elements of
its cause of action. State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

76-5-207

-Evidence sufficient.
A conviction of manslaughter, after a bench
trial, was contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence, where defendant fatally shot her husband after his violent physical attack, coupled
with his threats to kill her, led her to believe
that she was in immediate danger of serious
injury or death. State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Cited in State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 91.

40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide

76-5-207. Automobile

C.J.S. - 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 93, 94.
Key Numbers. -Homicide e,,, 74.

homicide.

(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent
manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol
content under this section.
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of
violating this section.
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content
is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled
vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine,
watercraft, or aircraft.
(1)
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History: C. 1953, 76-5-207, enacted by L.
1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1988, ch. 148, § 2;
1993, ch. 161, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1985
(1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1 repealed former § 76-5207, as last amended by L. 1983, ch. 99, § 20,
relating to automobile homicide, and enacted
present § 76-5-207.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted Subsection (6) for former language admitting any
chemical test if in accordance with the Rules of

Evidence and if administered either with consent or without consent when the officer reasonably believes that the victim may die; deleted former Subsection (7), which required a
chemical test when a defendant is placed under
arrest; renumbered former Subsection (8) as
Subsection (7); deleted "but is not limited to"
after "includes" in Subsection (7); and made
stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Jurisdiction of juvenile court, § 78-3a-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
marked disregard for safety of others, conviction of involuntary manslaughter was improper; there could be no finding of criminal
negligence upon the question of speed. State v.
Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 457 (1930);
State v. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 P.2d 943
(1940); State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125
P.2d 429 (1942).
Driver of automobile was not guilty of manslaughter just because his vehicle was an instrumentality by means of which someone was
killed; failure to see deceased in time to avoid
hitting him did not by itself show recklessness
or marked disregard for safety of others. State
v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Causation.
Causing death of fetus.
Death by automobile.
Double jeopardy.
Evidence.
Evidence sufficient.
Negligent homicide.
Proof of corpus delicti.

Constitutionality.
Former § 76-30-7.4, which described automobile homicide, was not unconstitutional on
grounds that it substituted status of being
under influence of drugs or liquor for criminal
intent. State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333
P.2d 1075 (1959).

Double jeopardy.
Where defendant was charged originally
with negligent homicide under former § 41-643.10, and after preliminary hearing the charge
was dismissed and he was charged, tried, and
convicted of automobile homicide, he had not
been placed twice in jeopardy by having been
tried for automobile homicide after dismissal of
original charge. State v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d
210, 364 P.2d 828 (1961).

Causation.
In prosecution of driver involved in intersection collision charged with automobile homicide, jury was not required to find defendant to
be sole proximate cause of death before handing down guilty verdict, and court was not
required to give jury instruction on superseding
intervening cause, since any negligence on part
of other driver could only have been concurrent
cause. State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah
1983).

Evidence.
Negligibly gruesome photographs merely
showing that a severe accident occurred and
that defendant failed to use his brakes were not
cumulative or prejudicial. State v. Pascoe, 774
P.2d 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Causing death of fetus.
Term "death of another" does not include the
death of an unborn fetus, and person causing
death of unborn fetus by negligent operation of
an automobile does not commit automobile homicide. State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1978).
Death by automobile.
Conviction of motorist for speeding or reckless driving did not bar subsequent prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey,
65 Utah 609, 239 P. 25,-44 A.L.R. 558 (1925);
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258
(1945).
Where evidence did not show that defendant
was driving his automobile recklessly or with

Evidence sufficient.
Evidence that defendant drove into opposite
lane of traffic in car loaded with empty beer and
whiskey bottles and collided head-on with a car
driven in lawful manner by decedent's husband
in his outside lane was sufficient to sustain
conviction of automobile homicide. State v.
Cook, 21 Utah 2d 36, 439 P.2d 852 (1968).
The operation of a motor vehicle by a person
who is so intoxicated that he cannot do so safely
is a reckless act showing a marked disregard
for the safety of others; therefore, evidence
showing (1) that the driver was in such a state
of intoxication, and (2) that as a result of his
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negligence the death of another resulted will
support a conviction under this section; the
negligence required for violation of the statute
need not amount to "criminal negligence" as
defined in § 76-2-103(4), but negligence is
"criminal"when, notwithstanding the fact that
the actor's conduct does not evince a wanton or
reckless disregard for human safety, he does a
thing dangerous in itself, or has charge of a
thing dangerous in its use, and acts without
that degree of care which a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise under the circumstances, resulting in the death of another person. State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah
1977).

Negligent homicide.
Refusal in automobile homicide prosecution
to instruct jury on negligent homicide as a

76-5-301

lesser included offense was not error since
automobile homicide did not require the degree
of negligence requisite to constitute negligent
homicide; offense of automobile homicide could
be made out by simple negligence in a person's
driving while intoxicated if death of another
resulted therefrom, while negligent homicide
required more than carelessness or simple negligence. State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah 1974).

Proof of corpus delicti.
In prosecution for automobile homicide,
where defendant was driving on wrong side of
street when he collided head-on with car in
which the decedent was riding, and woman who
proved to be the deceased was observed to be
bleeding and was pronounced dead on arrival
at the hospital, corpus delicti was proven. State
v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d 210, 364 P.2d 828 (1961).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7AAm. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 324 et seq.
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 660.
A.L.R.- Homicide by automobile as murder,
21 A.L.R.3d 116.

Alcohol-related vehicular homicide: nature
and elements of offense, 64 A.L.R.4th 166.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e:o 342.

76-5-208. Child abuse homicide.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes child abuse homicide if the actor causes
the death of a person under 17 years of age and the death results from child
abuse:
(a) if done recklessly as provided in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(b);
(b) if done with criminal negligence as provided in Subsection 76-5109(2)(c); or
(c) if done with the mental culpability as provided in Subsection
76-5-109(3)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Child abuse homicide as defined in Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree
felony.
(3) Child abuse homicide as defined in Subsections (l)(b) and (c) is a third
degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-208, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 65, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 65 be-

came effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PARTS
KIDNAPING
76-5-301. Kidnaping.
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and
without authority of law and against the will of the victim:
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
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(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances expo;:;ing him to risk
of serious bodily injury; or
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or
guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-301; 1983, ch. 88, § 13.

Cross-References.
10-1504.

-

Bus hijacking, § 76-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
sault, but was an independent, separately punishable offense, where defendant detained
victim for a substantial period of time and
forcibly removed her a substantial distance
from her normal surroundings and natural
sources of aid to an isolated area where she was
entirely at the mercy of her assailant and
sexually assaulted. State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89
(Utah 1981).

ANALYSIS

Circumstances exposing victim to risk.
Evidence that victim a minor.
Kidnaping as separate offense.
Lesser included offenses.
Multiple victims.
Substantial period.
When kidnaping begins.
Circumstances exposing victim to risk.
The provision of this section that detention
be in circumstances exposing the victim to risk
of serious bodily injury requires some circumstances of risk in addition to those inherent in
the commission of crimes incidentally involving
detention or restraint. State v. Couch, 635 P.2d
89 (Utah 1981).
Evidence that victim a minor.
Evidence was sufficient to establish victim's
minority for purposes of sustaining a conviction
of kidnaping a minor where victim's mother
and two police officers testified that victim was
a "child" or "little girl," one officer testified that
victim appeared to be about ten years old, and
jurors themselves observed the victim as she
testified and were able to determine from her
appearance and behavior whether reasonable
doubt existed as to whether she was a minor.
State v. Cross, 649 P.2d 72 (Utah 1982).
Kidnaping as separate offense.
Kidnaping was not merely incidental or subsidiary to the crime of aggravated sexual as-

Lesser included offenses.
Unlawful detention, § 76-5-304, is not a
lesser included offense of kidnaping a minor.
State v. Cross, 649 P.2d 72 (Utah 1982).
Multiple victims.
Defendant's holding five persons hostage was
five separate offenses of kidnaping arising out
of a single criminal episode; double jeopardy
protections did not prohibit defendant from
being convicted of five counts of kidnaping.
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981).
Substantial period.
The term "substantial period" apparently requires a period of detention longer than the
minimum inherent in the commission of other
crimes, such as robbery or rape, which involve
detention or restraint. State v. Couch, 635 P.2d
89 (Utah 1981).
When kidnaping begins.
A kidnaping begins when the detention begins to be against the will of the victim. State v.
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 1 Am. J ur. 2d Abduction and
Kidnaping § 21 et seq.
C.J.S. - 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping§ 1.
A.L.R. - Seizure or detention for purpose of
committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as
constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43
A.L.R.3d 699.

Seizure of prison official by inmates as kidnaping, 59 A.L.R.3d 1306.
Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to
charge of kidnapping, 69 A.L.R.4th 1005.
Key Numbers. - Kidnapping <Sao1.
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76-5-301.1.

76-5-302

Child kidnaping.

(1) A person commits child kidnaping when the person intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports a child under
the age of 14 with intent to keep or conceal the child from its parent, guardian,
or other person having lawful custody or control of the child.
(2) A seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation is deemed to be
against the will of the victim if the victim is younger than 14 years of age at the
time of the offense, and the seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation,
is without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or
person acting in loco parentis.
(3) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section.
(4) Child kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years, and
which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-301.1, enacted by L.
1983,ch.88,§ 14; 1984, ch. 18, § 6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Evidence.
-Admissible.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
Subsection (4) is not unconstitutional: (1) it is
not cruel and unusual punishment on the theory that the sentences are disproportionate to
the crime of kidnaping, (2) it does not infringe
on inherent judicial power and authority, (3) it
does not invade the province of the Board of
Pardons, and (4) the sentencing scheme is not
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Shickles, 760
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).

-Admissible.
Evidence of defendant's sexual assaults on
the victim were properly admitted at his trial
for child kidnaping, because the evidence was
directly probative of the proposition that defendant took the victim out of the state with the
requisite intent and without a good faith belief
that he had implied permission from the child's
parents. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah
1988).
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Liability oflegal or natural parent,
or one who aids and abets, for damages resulting from abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7.

76-5-302. Aggravated

kidnaping.

(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim
with intent:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel
a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct; or
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(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function; or
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the
victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years and
which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12;
1983, ch. 88, § 15.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence.

ANALYSIS

Lesser included offenses.
Sentence.
-Constitutionality.
-Upheld.
Cited.

-Constitutionality.
The aggravated kidnaping minimum mandatory sentencing provision is constitutional.
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990).

Lesser included offenses.
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnaping was entitled to a jury instruction on assault
as a lesser included offense since there was
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of
evidence, however unlikely that might have
been, it could have voted to acquit him of
aggravated kidnaping and to convict him of
assault. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah
1984).

-Upheld.
Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory
sentences for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault found not cruel and
unusual punishment. See State v. Russell, 791
P.2d 188 (Utah 1990).
Cited in State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621
(Utah 1987); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987
(Utah 1989); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 1.
A.L.R. - What is "harm" within provisions

76-5-303.

of statutes increasing penalty for kidnaping
where victim suffers harm, 11 A.L.R.3d 1053.

Custodial interference.

( 1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under
the age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian:
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than
the visitation or custody period previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
having actual physical custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a
judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction which grants to another
person visitation or custody rights, and without good cause the actor conceals
or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful visitation
or custody rights.
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is
removed and taken from one state to another, in which case it is a felony of the
third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-303, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-303; 1979, ch. 70, § 1;
1984, ch. 18, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Custody.
Detaining child beyond visitation period.
Violation of custody order an element.
Custody.
While it may be possible to violate both
Subsections (1) and (2) simultaneously, the offense defined by Subsection (1) generally applies to the conduct of parents who do not have
primary custody, and Subsection (2) is intended
to apply to conduct by parents with primary
custody. State v. Smith, 764 P.2d 997 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Detaining child beyond visitation period.
Parent's detention of child beyond visitation
period was not crime of custodial interference
when the child was detained for a brief period
for the purpose of seeking legal intervention to

modify custody award and there was a good
faith belief by parent that he had good cause,
which he substantiated by filing a petition for
custody modification and receiving a temporary
restraining order to prevent the child's removal
from the state until the custodial issue could be
determined. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511
(Utah 1980).
Violation of custody order an element.
Subsection (l)(b) criminalizes the conduct of
those who, when exercising visitation or custody under the authority of a custody order, act
to deprive another person of her or his custodial
or visitation rights in derogation of that existing order. Even one who is subject to a custody
or visitation decree does not violate this section
unless he or she acts in derogation of his or her
right under the order. State v. Smith, 764 P.2d
997 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abduction and
Kidnaping § 34.
C.J.S. - 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping§ 4.

A.L.R. - Liability oflegal or natural parent,
or one who aids and abets, for damages resulting from abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7.

76-5-304. Unlawful detention.
(1) A person commits unlawful detention ifhe knowingly restrains another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-304, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-304.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
offense ofkidnaping a minor,§ 76-5-301. State
v. Cross, 649 P.2d 72 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Elements.
Kidnaping a minor.
Liability of peace officer.
Cited.

Elements.
For cases discussing definition and elements
of former offense of false imprisonment, see
Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, 1912B
Ann. Cas. 1366 (1910); Mildon v. Bybee, 13
Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962).
Kidnaping a minor.
Unlawful detention is not a lesser included

Liability of peace officer.
A peace officer would not necessarily be held
liable for mistaking identity of person named in
warrant of arrest ifhe had exercised reasonable
diligence and care in ascertaining identity before he served warrant. Mildon v. Bybee, 13
Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962).
Cited in State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment§ 151.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment§ 71.
A.L.R. - Excessiveness or inadequacy of
compensatory damages for false imprisonment

or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.
Penalties for common-law criminal offense of
false imprisonment, 67 A.L.R.4th 1103.
Key Numbers. - False Imprisonment
43.

PART4
SEXUAL OFFENSES
76-5-401.

Unlawful sexual intercourse.

(1) A person commits unlawful sexual intercourse if, under circumstances
not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-402, Section 76-5-402.1, or Section
76-5-405, that person has sexual intercourse with a person, not that person's
spouse, who is under sixteen years of age.
(2) Unlawful sexual intercourse is a felony of the third degree except when
at the time of intercourse the actor is no more than three years older than the
victim, in which case it is a class B misdemeanor. Evidence that the actor was
not more than three years older than the victim at the time of the intercourse
shall be raised by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-401; 1979, ch. 73, § 1;
1983, ch. 88, § 16.
Cross-References. -Adultery, bigamy, for-

nication and incest, §§ 76-7-101 to 76-7-104.
Mistake as to age not a defense, § 76-2304.5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Circumstantialevidence.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
Purpose of statutes.

Single offense charged.
Variance.

Circumstantial evidence.
Element of crime that female is not male
defendant's wife may be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Housekeeper, 588
P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).

140

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

Elements of offense.
Victim's age is an element of offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. State v. Elton, 680
P.2d 727 (Utah 1984).
Evidence.
In trial for offense of carnal knowledge, intimacy and improper relations of parties could be
proved only so far as such intimacy and improper relations occurred prior, and not subsequent, to offense relied on for conviction. State
v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P. 215 (1900).
In trial for carnal knowledge, testimony of
the prosecutrix who was not considered an
accomplice could alone be sufficient to support
conviction. State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P.
215 (1900); State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197,
381 P.2d 81 (1963).
In prosecution for carnal knowledge, child of
the prosecutrix could be brought into court to
corroborate her testimony as to its birth following alleged offense, but not to show resemblance to defendant. State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541,
65 P. 494 (1901).
Because prosecutrix was not an accomplice,
her testimony alone, if believed by the jury, was
sufficient to sustain a finding that sexual act
occurred in trial of offense of carnal knowledge,
and question of credibility arising from inconsistencies in testimony was for jury. State v.
Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 P. 270 (1913); State v.
Bayes, 47 Utah 474, 155 P. 335 (1916).
Evidence of former relations of parties and
that former acts were committed was admissible as tending to show probability or improbability of commission of offense of carnal knowledge. State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940
(1925).
Where state relied upon birth of child to
prosecutrix as evidence of crime charged, defendant was entitled to submit evidence that
prosecutrix had intercourse with others during
month of conception. State v. Orton, 69 Utah
304, 254 P. 1003 (1927).
Admissibility of evidence of birth of child was
not error, although child was born eight days
before the end of the ordinary period of gestation calculated from date offense was alleged to
have been committed. State v. Hanna, 81 Utah
583, 21 P.2d 537 (1933).
In prosecution for carnal knowledge, chastity
or general character of prosecutrix could not be
attacked, and since she was not an accomplice,
her testimony did not require corroboration;
but veracity of her testimony was material and
was subject to acceptance or rejection by court.
State v. Olson, 100 Utah 174, 111 P.2d 548
(1941).
Testimony of fourteen-year-old victim that
she did not know whether penetration was by
defendant's finger or his private, considered
with the age of complainant, circumstances of
assault, and conduct of defendant, did not form
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proper basis for reversal of conviction of carnal
knowledge. State v. Wixom, 106 Utah 382, 148
P.2d 806 (1947).
Where there was nothing inherently unreasonable or improbable in uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix, it alone could support
conviction if jury found guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d
211 (1952).
Accused could not be convicted on his confession alone, and in prosecution for carnal knowledge there must have been independent, clear
and convincing evidence of corpus delicti;
where girl in question refused to attend trial
and the only independent evidence of corpus
delicti to lend credence to confession was testimony of deputy who had asked the girl if
defendant and she had relations, it was insufficient to establish corpus delicti; truth of purported statement and veracity of one who made
it should have been tested by cross-examination. State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173
(1954).
Where defendant was prosecuted on charge
of carnal knowledge, evidence regarding several events subsequent to date of alleged act
was admissible to show that defendant took
long, less-traveled road home, along whi_chroad
car in which defendant and prosecutrix were
traveling was stopped, and the act alleged
occurred; that defendant gave prosecutrix an
engagement ring; that defendant took her to
doctor, and that at family gathering called for
purpose of discussing pregnancy that had
taken place, defendant failed to deny having
had intercourse with prosecutrix; such evidence tended to show guilty knowledge or an
admission of responsibility. State V. Hodges, 14
Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 (1963).
Pregnancy of an unmarried prosecutrix could
be shown to prove that an illicit act of intercourse had taken place; weight to be given such
evidence was question for trier of fact. State v.
Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 (1963).

Indictment or information.
Information charging defendant with assaulting victim and committing offense of carnal knowledge need not have stated that ravished female was not defendant's wife. State v.
Williamson, 22 Utah 248, 62 P. 1022, 83. Am.
St. R. 780 (1900).
In prosecution for carnal knowledge offemale
under age of eighteen years, time was not
material ingredient, and it was not essential
that it be precisely stated in information; evidence of commission of offense, alleged on date
other than and prior to that alleged, was competent and admissible. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah
186, 102 P. 1000 (1909).
Instructions.
Refusal of court to give cautionary instruc-
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tions was not error where testimony of prosecutrix was corroborated and jury was properly
instructed as to presumption of defendant's
innocence, requirement that he be found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and that jury was
sole judge of weight of evidence and credibility
of witnesses. State v. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546,
227 P. 479 (1924).
For cases discussing necessity of specifying
time of former offense of carnal know ledge, see
State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113
(1927); State v. Hanna, 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d
537 (1933); State v. Rosenberg, 84 Utah 402, 35
P.2d 1004 (1934).
Instruction that referred to "the place where
the offense was committed, at the time of the
commission thereof" assumed that offense had
been committed and was prejudicial error.
State v. Hanna, 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537
(1933).
Purpose of statutes.
The purpose of former statutes establishing
the age of consent was to protect young girls
from illicit acts of the opposite sex; even if
married, they could continue to be immature
and need such protection, which the statute

provided. State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283,
204 P.2d 448 (1949).
Single offense charged.
Where single offense was charged, but on
trial six different offenses were proven, four of
them prior to offense charged, and state failed
to elect on which offense to stand, the law made
the election and chose first offense of which
evidence was offered; thereafter no subsequent
election could be made, nor could state prove
any other act of carnal knowledge as substantive offense on which conviction could be had.
State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P. 215 (1900).
Variance.
In prosecution for carnal knowledge offemale
under eighteen years of age, where defendant
was given preliminary examination on complaint charging offense had been committed on
April 1, and information charged offense on
that date, but proof showed that female was
then over eighteen years of age, evidence of
prior acts of intercourse before female became
eighteen was not sufficient to sustain conviction since state had elected to try defendant for
offense committed on April 1. State v. Hoben, 36
Utah 186, 102 P. 1000 (1909).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - State v. Elton: The
Failure to Recognize a Defense to Statutory
Rape, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 437.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, Who Pays for the Cure? Restitution for
Adolescent Rape Victims, 13 J. Contemp. L. 301
(1987).
The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal
Rights, 16 J. Contemp. L. 23 (1990).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 65 Am. Jur. 2d Rape § 15.
C.J.S. - 75 C.J.S. Rape § 13.
A.L.R. - Mistake or lack of information as to
victim's age as defense to statutory rape, 8
A.L.R.3d 1100.
Impotency as defense to charge to rape, attempt to rape, or assault with intent to commit
rape, 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.
Recantation by prosecuting witness in sex
crime as ground for new trial, 51 A.L.R.3d 907.
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Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution,
45 A.L.R.4th 310.
Conviction of rape or related sexual offenses
on basis of intercourse accomplished under the
pretext of, or in the course of, medical treatment, 65 A.L.R.4th 1064.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility in prosecution for sex offense of
evidence of victim's sexual activity after the
offense, 81 A.L.R.4th 1076.
Statute protecting minors in a specified age
range from rape or other sexual activity as
applicable to defendant minor within protected
age group, 18 A.L.R.5th 856.
Key Numbers. - Rape e=> 52(2).

Rape.

(1) A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with
another person without the victim's consent.
(2) This section applies whether or not the actor is married to the victim.
(3) Rape is a felony of the first degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-402; 1977, ch. 86, § 1;

1979,ch.73,§
267,§ 1.
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Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, deleted "not the
actor's spouse" following "another person" in
Subsection (1), added present Subsection (2),
and redesignated former Subsection (2) as Subsection (3).
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Cross-References.
Attempt, §§ 76-4101, 76-4-102.
Evidence regarding victim, U.R.E. 412.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Aggravated sexual assault distinguished.
Consent.
-Lack of consent.
Date of alleged offense.
Defenses.
Degree of resistance.
Delay in complaining.
Elements.
Evidence.
-Admissibility.
-Corroborative.
-Sufficiency.
Included offenses.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
Intent.
Juvenile testimony.
Mental state of accused.
Misjoinder with sodomy charge.
Overcoming victim's will.
Polygraph test.
Prejudice.
Threats.
Uncorroborated testimony.
Vicarious liability.
Victim's age as element of rape.
Victim's prior sexual experience.
Cited.
Aggravated sexual assault distinguished.
Elements of the two crimes of rape and aggravated sexual assault are not the same, since
the latter offense includes the additional element of infliction or threat of serious bodily
injury. State v. Smathers, 602 P.2d 708 (Utah
1979).
There is a sufficient difference between rape
and aggravated sexual assault to justify the
statutory distinction between the two offenses.
State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989).
Aggravated sexual assault encompasses a
broader scope of criminal conduct than rape,
and it includes attempted criminal conduct;
thus, rape is not a predicate felony for aggravated sexual assault because the two crimes
require proof of different elements. State v.
Hancock, 874 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Consent.
Where prosecutrix was first laid hold of by
force and violence against her will, but did not
afterwards resist because, in some degree, she

voluntarily consented to defendant's acts, defendant should not have been convicted ofrape,
although he could have been convicted of assault. State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818
(1898).
In prosecution for rape, fact that prosecutrix
received money from defendant did not of itself
establish consent. State v. Roberts, 91 Utah
117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
It was not necessary to show that victim
resisted to her utmost capacity to prevent penetration in order to show that there was no
consent and act was forcibly done. State v.
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
In prosecution for rape, jury could properly
consider conduct of prosecutrix towards defendant after commission of assault as bearing
upon whether she consented. State v. Roberts,
91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
If a woman is friendly in accepting the proffered hospitality of a man for food and drink,
and engages in necking over a period of time,
she does not lose her right to protest against
further advances the man may desire to force
upon her. State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah
1980).
Fact that prosecutrix assisted defendant in
achieving erection by means of manual stimulation did not establish consent in view of fact
that prosecutrix was held against her will and
expressly threatened with violence. State v.
Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980).
A rape victim's failure to escape or call for
help despite the opportunity to do so is not
necessarily inconsistent with the victim's assertion that she did not consent. State v.
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987).
-Lack of consent.
The absence of outcries, serious wounds or
injuries, or physical resistance induced by fear
or reasonable apprehension of bodily harm or
death does not establish consent to the act.
State v. Stettina, 635 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981).
Where state presents evidence that rape and
forcible sodomy victim is under 14 years of age,
no other evidence is needed to establish lack of
consent to the acts. State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58
(Utah 1984).
Date of alleged offense.
Where complaint on preliminary examination for statutory rape charged act of unlawful
intercourse as having occurred on July 13,
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defendant could not be convicted for offense
committed on same girl on July 15. State v.
Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918).

Defenses.
Bad reputation of prosecutrix for chastity
was not defense to charge of assault with intent
to commit rape, if prosecutrix was forced
against her will. State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170,
51 P. 818 (1898).
Insanity was defense to statutory rape if
properly proven. State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109,
234 P. 940 (1925).
Degree of resistance.
The victim need do no more than her age and
her strength of body and mind make it reasonable for her to do under the circumstances to
resist. State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah
1977).
Delay in complaining.
Whether prosecutrix complained of alleged
rape immediately thereafter, or delayed making complaint for considerable time, bore on
credibility of her testimony. State v. Halford, 17
Utah 475, 54 P. 819 (1898).
Elements.
Emission of semen was not essential to constitute the crime of rape. State v. Warner, 79
Utah 500, 291 P. 307, rev'd on another point, 79
Utah 510, 13 P.2d 317 (1932).
Emission of semen is not necessary to crime
of rape; penetration is all that is necessary.
State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 1984).
Evidence.
-Admissibility.
In prosecution for rape, wherein it was theory of defendant that prosecutrix had had intercourse with another person, and wrongfully
had charged defendant with offense to shield
herself in view of her supposed pregnancy,
defendant had right to prove that such was her
purpose in lodging complaint against defendant
and that she had had intercourse with other
person. State v. Scott, 55 Utah 553, 188 P. 860
(1920).
In prosecution for rape of ten-year-old girl,
where prosecutrix' gonorrheal infection was relied on by state as evidence ofcommission of the
crime, defendant could submit evidence that
prosecutrix' father, mother and sister also had
disease, in order to cast doubt on contention
that defendant was source of infection. State v.
Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 P. 142 (1927).
In a prosecution for rape by defendant of his
minor daughter, evidence of his stepdaughter
that defendant had raped her four different
times in the past was inadmissible. State v.
Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 (1957).
Testimony of doctor, who had examined fifteen-year-old prosecutrix, that the examination

showed that girl's hymen had been recently
torn, that tears were fresh and still bleeding,
and that a hymen which is intact normally
indicates virginity was admissible in rape prosecution because evidence would be material as
surrounding circumstance of crime, and as having tendency to prove that girl was violated.
State v. Glispy, 10 Utah 2d 13, 347 P.2d 562
(1959).
Where there was reasonable foundation for
admitting opinion testimony of doctor as to
whether the prosecutrix had been forcibly attacked, it was within discretion of court to
admit evidence and to allow any frailties
therein to be exposed by cross-examination.
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865
(1959).
In prosecution for statutory rape, testimony
of the physician who examined prosecutrix to
the effect that her hymen was ruptured and
that she was capable of having intercourse with
an adult was properly admitted to show the
possibility that she had had intercourse. State
v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429,361 P.2d 174 (1961).
In prosecution for statutory rape, it was not
error to admit the testimony of the prosecutrix
that while she was in the bedroom with the
defendant, some other men who had come to
the house with defendant were in another room
taking turns committing a similar offense with
her sister; this evidence was material to show
all relevant facts surrounding commission of
offense charged. State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d
429, 361 P.2d 174 (1961).
In prosecution for statutory rape, it was not
error to admit the testimony of a police captain
that defendant had been defensive and evasive
by making denials when first questioned about
his association with girl's mother and visits to
their home, and that he had later made admissions of truth inconsistent with his denials;
such evidence reasonably could be regarded as
showing awareness of guilt and desire to protect himself by misleading officers in investigation. State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d
174 (1961).

-Corroborative.
Corroboration in a rape case may consist of
circumstantial rather than direct evidence and
is sufficient if it affords proof of circumstances
which legitimately tend to show the existence
of the material facts; prosecutrix's claim that
act of intercourse occurred without her consent
was corroborated where witness testified that
prosecutrix told him the story of the rape
shortly after it occurred and that she was
crying and very upset. State v. Stettina, 635
P.2d 75 (Utah 1981).
-Sufficiency.
Conviction of rape of thirteen-year-old subnormal girl, whose mental age was between

144

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
eight and ten and who had frequent epileptic
seizures, was not sustained by evidence; victim's testimony was unclear as to sequence of
events which preceded and followed alleged
rape, the time period during which rape was
alleged to have occurred was extremely short,
and locus of rape was alleged to have been only
a few feet from defendant's car, which was
parked on public city street at dusk, where two
of his companions had been waiting for him to
return from a house, and where neither his
companions nor any other witness testified as
to having seen or heard anything to indicate
improper conduct on defendant's part. State v.
Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 (1947).
Evidence which tended to show that prosecutrix was an unwilling passenger in defendant's
car, medical evidence of recent sexual intercourse and severe bruises and cuts on prosecutrix' legs tending to show involuntary nature of
act supported conviction of forcible rape. State
v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 (1947).

Included offenses.
In prosecution for rape of six-year-old girl,
verdict of guilty of assault with intent to commit rape was within power of jury though it
might have appeared that rape was actually
completed. State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58 P.
1108(1899).
Crime of adultery was not necessarily included in crime of rape and did not constitute
lesser degree of that offense; prosecutor could
not insert words in information wholly unnecessary to principal crime charged, thereby
charging another offense, but where no timely
objection was made to statement that victim
was a married woman, objection was waived.
State v. Anderson, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280
(1926).
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In prosecution for rape, instruction that jury
could determine weight and credibility to be
given testimony of female upon whom it was
alleged rape had been committed, and who had
testified to facts and circumstances of the rape,
"as of any other witness testifying in the case,"
was erroneous, since prosecutrix necessarily
had greater interest in result of case than
disinterested witness would have had. State v.
Scott, 55 Utah 553, 188 P. 860 (1920).
Instruction which included text of§ 76-5-406
was sufficient, without further elaboration, to
meet the requirement of making clear to jury in
rape case that the force and threats had to be of
such character and had such an effect on prosecutrix as to overcome an earnest desire on her
part to resist. State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728
(Utah 1976).
Instruction that either force or threat may be
used to overcome a victim's resistance is proper.
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985).

Intent.
Where defendant returned to girl's home and
performed acts which indicated his intention to
accomplish intercourse by force and then suddenly passed out or fell asleep, he was guilty of
assault with intent to commit rape since there
was nothing which indicated an intention on
defendant's part to cease or withdraw voluntarily from struggle. State v. Waters, 122 Utah
592, 253 P.2d 357 (1953).
Juvenile testimony.
In a sex crime case, testimony of a child is not
inherently improbable simply because it reflects the age, immaturity and juvenile vocabulary of a child. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1985).
Mental state of accused.
This section does not require any specific
mental state, and the crime may be proved by
an intentional, knowing, or reckless mental
state. State v. Whitehair, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah
1987).

Indictment or information.
Information charging defendant with being
an accessory to rape of fourteen-year-old girl
alleging that defendant had taken principal
and prosecutrix in his car and had let them out
on road, waiting in car some distance away
until principal called after committing crime,
but which did not allege knowledge or intent on
part of defendant to aid principal in commission of crime of rape on prosecutrix, was insufficient. State v. Steele, 67 Utah 1, 245 P. 332
(1926); State v. Davis, 67 Utah 7, 245 P. 334
(1926).
Any allegation of force in information for
assault upon girl under age of thirteen was
surplusage. State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62
P.2d 1110 (1936).

Overcoming victim's will.
The victim's will and resistance may be overcome by either physical force and violence, or by
psychological or emotional stress, or by a combination thereof. State v. Studham, 572 P.2d
700 (Utah 1977).

Instructions.
On prosecution for rape of six-year-old girl,
charge of rape necessarily included charge of
assault with intent to commit rape. State v.
Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58 P. 1108 (1899).

Polygraph test.
In rape case tried without a jury where the
only issue was the consent of the prosecutrix
and the only witnesses were defendant and
prosecutrix, conviction could not be sustained

Misjoinder with sodomy charge.
Rape charges involving defendant's two stepdaughters should have been severed from
charge of sodomy involving his stepson. State v.
Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979).
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where sole basis for judge's decision was polygraph test results in situation where (1) defendant was given his test without presence of
counsel, (2) defendant signed stipulation as to
admission of test results but state did not, (3)
defendant appeared to have tried deception
when asked whether he had forced victim to
have sex but test of victim was inconclusive as
to whether she had given her consent, and (4) in
this case state argued the test results were
reliable and should have been admitted without a stipulation but in similar pending case
state argued test results are inherently unreliable and should not be admitted. State v. Abel,
600 P.2d 994 (Utah 1979).

Prejudice.
Prosecutor's reference to the fact that defendant was a black man did not prejudice the jury,
where the fact that defendant was black was
obvious to the jury, and there was no indication
that the remark was made with derogatory
intent or to suggest that because defendant was
black, he was more likely to have committed
the alleged crime. State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d
445 (Utah 1989).
Threats.
Threats were sufficient, for purposes of crime
of rape, if they were such as to create real
apprehension of dangerous consequences, or of
great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied
by apparent power of execution, or were such as
in any manner to overpower mind of woman so
that she dare not resist. State v. McCune, 16
Utah 170, 51 P. 818 (1898).
Uncorroborated testimony.
The testimony of a rape victim, without additional evidence, can support a conviction,
especially where nothing contradicts the victim's testimony. State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1987).

Vicarious liability.
One who aided and abetted another in commission of rape could be guilty of rape though
he did not have intercourse with prosecutrix.
State v. Brinkman, 68 Utah 557, 251 P. 364
(1926).
Victim's age as element of rape.
For crime of rape, victim's age is not an
element of crime if victim did not consent to act
of sexual intercourse; if victim did consent in
fact to act but was under age of 14, law treats
act as having been done without consent, and
only in that circumstance is age of victim an
element of crime of rape. Smith v. Morris, 690
P.2d 560 (Utah 1984).
Victim's prior sexual experience.
In prosecution for rape, if prosecutrix had
had sexual intercourse with defendant at other
times than one in question, that fact could
ordinarily be shown; but prosecutrix could not
be interrogated on cross-examination as to
whether she had had sexual intercourse with
others than defendant. State v. Scott, 55 Utah
553, 188 P. 860 (1920).
Absent circumstances which enhance its probative value, evidence of a rape victim's sexual
promiscuity, whether in the form of testimony
concerning her general reputation or testimony
concerning specific acts with persons other
than defendant, is ordinarily insufficiently probative to outweigh the highly prejudicial effect
of its introduction at trial. State v. Archuleta,
747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987).
Cited in State v. Logan, 712 P.2d 262 (Utah
1985); State ex rel. R.W., 717 P.2d 258 (Utah
1986); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah
1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Rape Victim Confrontation - 1985, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 3, 687.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 65 Am. Jur. 2d Rape§ 7.
C.J.S. - 75 C.J.S. Rape § 11.
A.L.R. - Impotency as defense to charge of
rape, attempt to rape, or assault with intent to
commit rape, 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.
Admissibility of prosecution evidence on issue of consent, that rape victim was a virgin,
absent defense attack on her chastity, 35
A.L.R.3d 1452.
Seizure or detention for purpose of committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as constituting separate crime ofkidnaping, 43 A.L.R.3d
699.
Recantation by prosecuting witness in sex

crime as ground for new trial, 51 A.L.R.3d 907.
Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution,
45 A.L.R.4th 310.
Conviction of rape or related sexual offenses
on basis of intercourse accomplished under the
pretext of, or in the course of, medical treatment, 65 A.L.R.4th 1064.
Prosecution of female as principal for rape,
67 A.L.R.4th 1127.
Fact that murder-rape victim was dead at
time of penetration as affecting conviction for
rape, 76 A.L.R.4th 1147.
Key Numbers. - Rape
9 et seq.
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76-5-402.2

76-5-402.1. Rape of a child.
(1) A person commits rape of a child when the person has sexual intercourse
with a child who is under the age of 14.
(2) Rape of a child is punishable, as a felony of the first degree, by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum mandatory
term of 5, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402.1, enacted by L.
1983,ch. 88, § 18.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Testimonyof prosecutrix.
Victim'sage as element of rape.
Cited.

Testimony of prosecutrix.
In prosecution for statutory rape, it was
within discretion of judge to permit ten-yearold prosecutrix to testify; child that age was
assumed to be qualified if she appeared to have
sufficient intelligence, understood questions,
knew and remembered facts, and had sense of
moral duty to tell truth. State v. Sanchez, 11
Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 (1961).

Victim's age as element of rape.
For crime of rape, victim's age is not an
element of crime if victim did not consent to act;
if victim did consent in fact to act but was under
age of 14, law treats act as having been done
without consent, and only in that circumstance
is age of victim an element of crime of rape.
Smith v. Morris, 690 P.2d 560 (Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986); Matthew v. Cook, 754 P.2d 666 (Utah
1988); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah
1988); State v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case
had prior sexual experience for purposes of

showing alternative source of child's ability to
describe sex acts, 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

76-5-402.2. Object rape.
A person who, without the victim's consent, causes the penetration, however
slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person who is 14 years of age
or older, by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, not including
a part of the human body, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily
pain to the victim or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, commits an offense which is punishable as a felony of the first
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402.2, enacted by L.

1983, ch. 88, § 19; 1984, ch. 18, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Instructions.
-Failure to follow.
Where defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault, and the jury, after being
instructed that it could find him guilty of only

one lesser included offense, convicted him of
object rape, forcible sodomy, and forcible sexual
abuse, the object rape conviction was affirmed
and the other two convictions were vacated as
surplusage. State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48
(Utah 1989).
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Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 159.

76-5-402.3.

Object rape of a child.

A person who causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal
opening of a child who is under the age of 14 by any foreign object, substance,
instrument, or device, not including a part of the human body, with intent to
cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to the child or with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, commits an offense which is
punishable as a felony of the first degree, by imprisonment in the state prison
for a term which is a minimum mandatory term of 5, 10, or 15 years and which
may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402.3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 159.
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case

76-5-403.

had prior sexual experience for purposes of
showing alternative source of child's ability to
describe sex acts, 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

Sodomy - Forcible sodomy.

(1) A person commits sodomy when the actor engages in any sexual act with
a person who is 14 years of age or older involving the genitals of one person and
mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy when the actor commits sodomy upon
another without the other's consent.
(3) Sodomy is a class B misdemeanor. Forcible sodomy is a felony of the first
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-403; 1977, ch. 86, § 2;

1979, ch. 73, § 3; 1983, ch. 88, § 21.
Cross-References. -Assault, § 76-5-102.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Defense of intoxication not applicable.
Elements.
Force.
Guilty plea under prior statute.
Instructions.
Juvenile testimony.
Misjoinder with rape charge.

Separate offenses.
- Forcible sexual abuse.
Cited.
Defense of intoxication not applicable.
Since in prosecution for sodomy no particular
intent was necessary element, defendant was
not entitled to instruction based on statute
which required jury to consider intoxication in
determining intent whenever any particular
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purpose, motive or intent was necessary element of crime. State v. Turner, 3 Utah 2d 285,
282 P.2d 1045 (1955).

Elements.
Emission is not a necessary element of the
crime of sodomy. State v. Peterson, 81 Utah
340, 17 P.2d 925 (1933).
Penetration is not a necessary element of
forcible sodomy. State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990
(Utah 1982).
Force.
Jury verdict of guilty of forcible sodomy was
supported by evidence that victim was given a
pill by defendant prior to the commission of the
offense, that the victim then became weak,
dizzy,and on the verge of unconsciousness and
was later found to have an unusually high
concentration of trichloral ethanol in her system, and that the victim performed fellatio
upon defendant only after he became angry and
threatened her with a beer bottle. State v.
Archuletta, 597 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1979).
Guilty plea under prior statute.
It was a violation of due process for defendant, who pled guilty under prior sodomy statute which did not contain force as an element,
to be sentenced under this section after a hearing determined defendant had used force. Von
Atkinson v. Smith, 575 F.2d 819 (10th Cir.
1978).

76-5-403.1

Instructions.
In trial for forcible sodomy, where jury asked
trial court for an instruction on the meaning of
the term "genitals" as used in this section, it
was reversible error for trial court to refuse to
give the requested instruction. State v. Couch,
635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981).
Juvenile testimony.
In a sex crime case, testimony of a child is not
inherently improbable simply because it reflects the age, immaturity and juvenile vocabulary of a child. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1985).
Misjoinder with rape charge.
Sodomy charge involving defendant's stepson
should have been severed from charges of rape
involving his two stepdaughters. State v.
Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979).
Separate offenses.
-Forcible sexual abuse.
Forcible sexual abuse was not a lesser included offense of forcible sodomy, because neither of the acts on which the forcible sexual
abuse counts were based satisfied the elements
of forcible sodomy. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233
(1989).
Cited in State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Legislative Violence
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 Utah L.
•
Rev. 209.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Right of
Privacy - State Statute Prohibiting Private
Consensual Sodomy Is Constitutional, 1977
B.Y.U.L. Rev. 170.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - The
Ugly Mirror: Bowers, Plessy and the Reemergence of the Constitutionalism of Social Stratification and Historical Reinforcement, 19 J.
Contemp. L. 21 (1993).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 70A Am. Jur. 2d Sodomy
§§ 3, 17.
C.J.S. - 81 C.J.S. Sodomy§ 4.

A.L.R. - Recantation by prosecuting witness in sex crime as ground for new trial, 51
A.L.R.3d 907.
Prejudicial effect of prosecutor's reference in
argument to homosexual acts or tendencies of
accused which are not material to his commission of offense charged, 54 A.L.R.3d 897.
Consent as defense in prosecution for sodomy, 58 A.L.R.3d 636.
Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution,
45 A.L.R.4th 310.
Key Numbers. - Sodomy e:, 1.

76-5-403.1. Sodomy on a child.
(1) A person commits sodomy upon a child if the actor engages in any sexual
act upon or with a child who is under the age of 14, involving the genitals or
anus of the actor or the child and the mouth or anus of either person,
regardless of the sex of either participant.
(2) Sodomy upon a child is punishable as a felony of the first degree, by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum mandatory
term of 5, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life.
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History: C. 1953, 76-5-403.1, enacted by L.
1983,ch.88,§
22;1988,ch. 156,§ 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ment of defendant who admitted sexually abusing his niece on several occasions over an extended period of time and while in a position of
trust toward the victim. State v. Copeland, 765
P.2.d 1266 (Utah 1988).
The fact that defendant was a victim of
sexual abuse as a child did not make the
imposition of a ten-year minimum mandatory
sentence cruel punishment as applied to him in
contrast to other offenders. State v. Bastian,
765 P.2d 902 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Guilty plea vacated.
Information.
Mandatory sentence.
- Challenge on appeal.
Sufficiency of evidence.
Testimony.
-Instructions.
-Leading questions.
-Related offense.
Time of offense.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section is not a special law which violates Utah Const., Art. VI, § 26. All people
convicted of the crime are treated similarly by
the statute. There is a reasonable basis for
distinguishing between those who commit child
sodomy and those who commit other offenses.
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).
Guilty plea vacated.
Defendant's guilty plea was vacated, because
neither his affidavit regarding the plea agreement nor the transcript of the plea itself contained language clearly and unequivocally advising him that by pleading guilty to sodomy on
a child he was subjecting himself to a mandatory prison sentence of at least five years. State
v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989).
Information.
Incorrectly amended information did not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant's conviction, because defendant's counsel understood how the information
was to be amended, and throughout the trial,
all parties acted as though the information had
been amended correctly. State v. Ireland, 773
P.2d 1375 (1989).
Mandatory sentence.
This section, which does not permit a judge to
suspend the sentence of a defendant convicted
of child sodomy, does not infringe the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. Courts have no inherent power to permanently suspend a statutorily defined sentence.
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme
does not interfere with the inherent power of
the court to impose sentences and the power of
the Board of Pardons to commute sentences.
State v. Bywater, 748 P.2d 568 (Utah 1987).
Imposition of a 15-year minimum mandatory
sentence was not cruel and unusual punish-

-Challenge
on appeal.
The defendant argued on appeal that the
trial court erred in failing to make specific
findings offact and to articulate the standard of
proof applied in reaching the determination
that a sentence of middle severity should be
imposed. However, the defendant had accepted
without challenge the reasons stated by trial
court for imposing the sentence. The issue not
having been raised in the trial court, the
longstanding rule of appellate review precluded
the issue from being raised for the first time on
appeal. State v. Bywater, 748 P.2d 568 (Utah
1987).
Sufficiency of evidence.
Evidence consisting of somewhat confused
and conflicting testimony of the defendant's
five-year-old son that the defentlant briefly
touched the boy's genitals while rubbing his
body with baby oil and testimony by the defendant's wife that he had bought the oil without
her knowledge did not establish a prima facie
case against the defendant. State v. Emmett,
839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).
Testimony.
- Instructions.
Upon trial for assault with intent to commit
sodomy upon child of tender years, in which
child was the principal witness, cautionary
instructions with regard to weight of such evidence should have been given to safeguard
rights of accused. State v. Morasco, 42 Utah 5,
128 P. 571 (1912).
Evidence, which consisted primarily of testimony of alleged victim who was under six years
of age, was sufficient to sustain conviction of
sodomy, where witness was examined by court
as to capability of receiving correct impressions
and ability to relate facts accurately, and where
court gave cautionary instruction calling jury's
attention to witness' tender years. State v.
Dixon, 114 Utah 301, 199 P.2d 775 (1948).
-Leading questions.
Use of leading questions was not error, in
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light of the victim's use of dolls to demonstrate
that defendant had sodomized him, the prosecutor's careful use of leading questions, and
the trial court's considered opinion that leading
questions were necessary to develop the victim's testimony. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375
(1989).

-Related offense.
There was no error in allowing the victim to
testify as to what occurred even though it
became necessary for him to mention defendant's criminal involvement with his brother,
where the crimes against the two boys were
committed at the same time and on the same
occasion and in the presence of each other, the
events being so intertwined that realistically
they could not be separated. State v. Nelson,
777 P.2d 479 (Utah 1989).
Time of offense.
Time is not a statutory element of the offense
charged under this section; when the prosecution does not have to prove the precise time of
the offense, insufficiency of the evidence on that
point is not a ground upon which the verdict
can be attacked. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208
(Utah 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.
Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1988).

76-5-404

There was no fatal variance between the
charges and the proof of sodomy on a child,
where the information stated that the offense
took place on or about June 1, 1983, and defendant's alibi evidence did not preclude the possibility that he abused the victim on May 31st
or June 2nd, two dates acceptably close to the
June 1st date charged in the information. State
v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed.
2d 864 (1988).
Defendant did not receive insufficient notice
of the time of the offense to permit him to
adequately prepare a defense to a charge of
sodomy on a child, where the information included an allegation that the offense took place
"on or about June 1, 1983" and defendant made
no inquiry of the prosecution regarding additional facts and did not raise the inadequacy of
the information before trial by written motion.
State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed.
2d 864 (1988).

Cited in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185
(Utah 1986); State v. Hadfield, 788 P.2d 506
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Criminal
Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177.
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence that ju-

76-5-404.

venile prosecuting witness in sex offense case
had prior sexual experience for purposes of
showing alternative source of child's ability to
describe sex acts, 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

Forcible sexual abuse.

(1) A person commits forcible sexual abuse if the victim is 14 years of age or
older and, under circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, sodomy, or
attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or any part of
the genitals of another, or touches the breast of a female, or otherwise takes
indecent liberties with another, or causes another to take indecent liberties
with the actor or another, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily
pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, without the consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any
participant.
(2) Forcible sexual abuse is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-404; 1977, ch. 86, § 3;

1979,ch.73,§
18, § 9.

[
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body part is an important fact in determining
whether a defendant has taken indecent liberties. State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
When the defendant enticed the youthful
female victim into an abandoned house by
pretense and there detained her against her
will for about 20 minutes to serve his sexual
purposes, and it was in that setting that he
placed his hand on the breast of his frightened,
pleading victim although fully clothed, the defendant did take indecent liberties. State v.
Peters, 796 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravated sexual assault distinguished.
Elements of proof.
Evidence.
Indecent liberties.
Intent.
Juvenile testimony.
Lack of consent.
Lesser included offenses.
Separate offenses.
Specific intent.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
The phrase "or otherwise takes indecent liberties" refers to acts of equal magnitude of
gravity to those specifically set forth in the
section and is not unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980).
Aggravated sexual assault distinguished.
Aggravated sexual assault is distinguishable
from forcible sexual abuse. State v. Cude, 784
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989).
Elements of proof.
It is not necessary for the state to prove the
absence of rape or attempted rape in order to
secure a conviction under this section, notwithstanding the language therein which specifies
that it applies only to certain acts committed
"under circumstances not amounting to rape ...
or attempted rape." State v. Peters, 550 P.2d
199 (Utah 1976).
Evidence.
Evidence of defendant's honesty and capacity
for truthfulness does not go to prove guilt or
innocence on a sexual abuse charge but may be
used to establish the credibility of the defendant as a witness. State v. Sisneros, 581 P.2d
1339 (Utah 1978).
Indecent liberties.
The momentary touching or grabbing of the
clothed breasts of an adolescent girl by a 17year-old boy does not come within the phrase
"otherwise takes indecent liberties with another"; use of disjunctive phrase "or otherwise"
was indicative oflegislative intent that conduct
proscribed by prohibition against indecent liberties was to be of equal gravity to that proscribed by prohibition against touching anus or
genitals. In re J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1980).
The brief touching of woman's clothed buttocks did not constitute "taking indecent liberties." In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127 (Utah 1982).
Absent any express direction from the Legislature, the presence of clothing on a touched

Intent.
Evidence was sufficient to establish that husband acted to gratify his sexual desires when he
forced his wife to have sexual intercourse with
other men, tape recorded and sometimes witnessed the acts of intercourse, and replayed the
recordings over and over again. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980).
This section requires only that defendant act
with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desires of any person and is not limited to his
own sexual desires. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d
594 (Utah 1980).
The intent required by the offense of forcible
sexual abuse is a general intent to take indecent liberties or touch the anus or genitals of
another without that person's permission and
the specific intent or purpose to cause substantial emotional or physical pain or to sexually
arouse or gratify any person. State v. Sessions,
645 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982).
Juvenile testimony.
In a sex crime case, testimony of a child is not
inherently improbable simply because it reflects the age, immaturity, and juvenile vocabulary of a child. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1985).
Lack of consent.
Outright violence, display of a weapon or
other extreme tactics is not a necessary element of a crime requiring lack of consent, to
establish lack of consent due to force or threats;
§ 76-5-406 requires, without more, such threat
of whatever character as will overcome the
resistance of a person of ordinary resolution;
husband's requiring of wife to have sexual
intercourse with other men through psychological abuse consisting of systematic harassment,
intimidation and abuse which included threats
of violence to wife and her father, threats of
separation of wife from her child, and threats of
blackmail was sufficient to overcome the resistance of a person of ordinary resolution and
establish lack of wife's consent, and, under such
circumstances, wife's failure to actively resist
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did not constitute consent to the intercourse
with the other men. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d
594 (Utah 1980).

Lesser included offenses.
Gross lewdness under circumstances which
perpetrator should know will likely cause affront or alarm, § 76-9-702, is a lesser included
offense of the felony of forcible sexual abuse. In
re L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127 (Utah 1982).
Assault is a lesser included offense of forcible
sexual abuse. State v. Jones, 243 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Separate offenses.
Defendant's contacts with victim were separate acts requiring proof of different elements
and constituted separate offenses. State v.
Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987).
Forcible sexual abuse was not a lesser included offense of forcible sodomy, because nei-

ther of the acts on which the forcible sexual
abuse counts were based satisfied the elements
of forcible sodomy. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233
(1989).

Specific intent.
Reasonable inference from defendant's admission that he had stroked and examined a
little girl was that he had intended to arouse or
gratify his sexual desires, though he denied
such intent; thus, his contention that there was
insufficient evidence of his intent was without
merit. State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 (Utah
1979).
Cited in State v. Logan, 712 P.2d 262
1985); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
1986); Robbins v. Cook, 737 P.2d 225
1986); State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48
1989).

(Utah
(Utah
(Utah
(Utah
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Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
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76-5-404.1. Sexual abuse of child abuse of child.

Constitutional

Aggravated

Law, 1987

sexual

(1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under circumstances not
amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or an
attempt to commit any of these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks,
or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child younger than 14 years of
age, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take
indecent liberties with the actor or another with intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant.
(2) Sexual abuse of a child is punishable as a second degree felony.
(3) A person commits aggravated sexual abuse of a child when in conjunction with the offense described in Subsection (1) any of the following circumstances have been charged and admitted or found true in the action for the
offense:
(a) The offense was committed by the use of a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601, or by force, duress, violence, intimidation,
coercion, menace, or threat of harm, or was committed during the course
of a kidnapping.
(b) The accused caused bodily injury or severe psychological injury to
the victim during or as a result of the offense.
(c) The accused was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the
victim for the purpose of committing the offense.
(d) The accused used, showed, or displayed pornography or caused the
victim to be photographed in a lewd condition during the course of the
offense.
(e) The accused, prior to sentencing for this offense, was previously
convicted of any felony, or of a misdemeanor involving a sexual offense.
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(f) The accused committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct.
(g) The accused committed, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five
separate acts, which if committed in Utah would constitute an offense
described in this chapter, and were committed at the same time, or during
the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant offense.
(h) The offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of
special trust in relation to the victim; "position of special trust" means that
position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of
that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and
includes, but is not limited to, the position occupied by a youth leader or
recreational leader who is an adult, adult athletic manager, adult coach,
teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer, foster parent, babysitter, or adult scout leader, though a natural parent, stepparent, adoptive
parent, or other legal guardian, not including a foster parent, who has
been living in the household, is not a person occupying a position of special
trust under this subsection.
(i) The accused encouraged, aided, allowed, or benefited from acts of
prostitution or sexual acts by the victim with any other person, or sexual
performance by the victim before any other person.
(4) Aggravated sexual abuse of a child is punishable as a first degree felony
by imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum mandatory
term of 3, 6, or 9 years and which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-404.1, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 24; 1984, ch. 18, § 10; 1989,
ch. 170, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Subsection (3)(g) constitutionally promotes a
legitimate legislative objective without undermining the principle that guilt must be established by probative evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988).
Subsection (3)(g) does not violate the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, since the
statute in no way makes punishment more
burdensome for acts perpetrated prior to enactment. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah
1988).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravating circumstances.
Bill of particulars.
Child witness.
Evidence.
- Character.
-Credibility of victim.
- Harmless error.
-Insufficient.
-Sufficient.
- Videotape.
Indecent liberties.
Lewdness.
Sexual exploitation of minor.
Time of offense.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The sentencing provisions of this section are
constitutional. State v. Kaus, 744 P.2d 1375
(Utah 1987).
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme
set forth in Subsections 76-5-404.1(4), 76-3201(5), 76-3-406(1), and 77-27-9(2) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Gerrish, 746
P.2d 762 (Utah 1987).

Aggravating circumstances.
Evidence supported finding that victim suffered sufficient bodily injury to warrant conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
State v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989).
A defendant's guilt or innocence on the primary charge of sexual abuse should first be
determined by the trier of fact before evidence
of the aggravating acts is adduced under Subsection (3)(g). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960
(1989).
Bill of particulars.
Although time is not a statutory element of

154

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
sexual abuse of a child under this section,
where the state amended the information, after
learning of the defendant's alibi defense, to
charge that the alleged offense, sexual abuse of
a child, occurred "on or about the first two
weeks of February, 1984," rather than "on or
about the 4th day of February, 1984," defendant
was clearly entitled to know whether this
change was made in good faith or to avoid the
alibi defense, and to any information the prosecution had that would have narrowed the time
period, but no prejudicial error was shown by
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for
bill of particulars since he did not supply a trial
transcript to show that he was unable to mount
whatever defenses he had against the charge.
State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985).

Child witness.
Six-year-old alleged victim of assault could
testify at trial after court determined that child
was sufficiently intelligent and mature to understand questions put to her, that she had
some knowledge of subject matter of inquiry,
that she was able to remember what happened,
and that she had a sense of moral duty to tell
the truth. State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401
P.2d 445 (1965).
Evidence.
The fact-finder is to determine the existence
of the circumstances in Subsection (3) at trial.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
-Character.
Since a defendant's character is not an element of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, the
court does not err in denying the request of a
defendant charged with that crime for admission of past instances of conduct relating to his
"reputation for sexual morality." State v. Miller,
709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for sexually abusing a child,
the judge's decision to exclude expert testimony
about the behavioral and personality characteristics of a "typical" child sexual offender was not
arbitrary or irrational, since the tendency of
such evidence to confuse the issues or mislead
the jury outweighed its probative value. State v.
Miller, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985).
Character is not an essential element of sexual abuse of a child. State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.d
432 (1989).
-Credibility of victim.
The trial court erred in allowing a sheriff's
secretary-deputy to testify about her prior experience with delayed reporting in sexual
abuse cases and on whether other victims were
truthfully reporting the alleged incidents of
abuse. State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
-Harmless error.
Erroneous admission of testimony of defen-

76-5-404.1

dant's two older daughters that he had sexually
abused them, before the jury decided whether
defendant had committed the primary charge
alleged against him, was not prejudicial, because the force of defendant's own confession on
the primary charge was so compelling as to
wipe out the shadow of prejudice. State v.
Wareham, 772 P.26 960 (1989).

-Insufficient.
One-and-a-half-year-old girl's exclamations,
"Ow bum," or "Ow bum daddy," uttered while
being bathed by her mother, was insufficient
evidence, as a matter of law, to support her
father's conviction of aggravated sexual abuse
of a child. State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (1989).
-Sufficient.
The evidence was sufficient to support father's conviction for forcible sexual abuse of his
12-year-old daughter. See State v. Thatcher,
667 P.2d 23 (Utah 1983).
Conflict between child victim's testimony at
preliminary hearing and at trial did not render
evidence as a whole so inconclusive as to warrant reversal. State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383
(Utah 1986).
Where there was evidence on the record of
commission of the elements of the offense, but
the defendant argued that this evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction because
the young victim gave confused testimony on
nonessential details, such as whether the offense occurred in the bedroom or the Jiving
room and where her mother was when the
alleged offense occurred, the evidence was sufficiently conclusive to eliminate any reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty. State v.
Lactod, 76i P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Victim's testimony, supported by the testimony of two investigating officers and the victim's grandmother, was abundantly sufficient
to support the jury's guilty verdict. State v.
Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077 (Ct. App. 1989).
- Videotape.
Admission of videotape of interview between
five year-old victim and Division of Family
Services worker was reversible error, where the
tape was the most damning evidence presented
at trial, and defendant was unable to explore
contradictory or confusing portions of the victim's testimony. State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432
(1989).
Indecent liberties.
Defendant's acts of inducing a child to disrobe for an illicit photo session, when viewed
with evidence of defendant's criminal intent,
constituted taking "indecent liberties with a
child." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah
1988).
Lewdness.
This section and the lewdness involving a
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child statute(§ 76-9-702.5) proscribe different
acts, and the requisite mens rea under the two
statutes is significantly different. State v. Vogt,
824 P.2d 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Sexual exploitation of minor.
This section and § 76-5a-3(1)(a) (sexual exploitation of a minor) were not designed to
proscribe parallel conduct. State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
The act of photographing "nude children"
under the provisions of the sexual exploitation
statute is different from photographing young
children in a "lewd condition" pursuant to the
sexual abuse statute. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439 (Utah 1988).
Time of offense.
Child's testimony that she could not remember any abuse occurring on the date alleged in
the information did not support defendant's

claim of insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Time was not an element of the
offense that the state was required to prove.
State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988).
Time is not a statutory element of sexual
abuse of a child. State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077
(Ct. App. 1989).
Time and place, except insofar as pertinent to
the statute of limitations, are not integral to a
charge of child sexual abuse. State v. Hoyt, 806
P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Cited in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987); State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah
1987); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988);
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989); State
v. Hadfield, 788 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990); State v.
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918 (Utah 1990); State v.
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
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Utah Law Review. - Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence
During the Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials State v. Bishop, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013.
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76-5-405.

Aggravated

Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case had prior
sexual experience for purposes of showing alternative source of child's ability to describe sex
acts, 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

sexual assault.

(1) A person commits aggravated sexual assault if in the course of a rape or
attempted rape, object rape or attempted object rape, forcible sodomy or
attempted forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse or attempted forcible
sexual abuse the actor:
(a) causes bodily injury to the victim;
(b) uses or threatens the victim by use of a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601;
(c) compels, or attempts to compel, the victim to submit to rape, object
rape, forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse, by threat of kidnapping,
death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person; or
(d) is aided or abetted by one or more persons.
(2) Aggravated sexual assault is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum mandatory term of
5, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-405; 1977, ch. 86, § 4;

1983,ch.88,§
170, § 5.

25;1986,ch.31,§

1;1989,ch.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aiders and abettors.
Elements of offense.
-Threat of injury.

Error on jury verdict form.
Evidence.
-Prosecutrix's prior sexual activity.
-Sufficient.
Forcible sexual abuse distinguished.
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Instructions.
- Deviation from information.
-Failure to follow.
Lesser included offenses.
Rape distinguished.
Sentences.
-Constitutionality.
-Upheld.
Separate acts.
Testimony of child.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
Any vagueness to be found in the minimum
mandatory term provision in Subsection (2) is
dispelled by the implementing language of Subsection 76-3-201(5), which plainly mandates
imposition of the sentence of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation of the crime. It is also plain from
that statute that imposition of the sentence of
highest severity is dependent upon a determination of the existence of aggravating circumstances, while imposition of the sentence of
lowest severity is dependent upon a determination of the existence of mitigating circumstances. State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558 (Utah
1987).
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme
provided for in this section is not violative of
equal protection or the separation of powers
requirement and does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d
1032 (Utah 1987).
Aiders and abettors.
Where record was replete with evidence that
would sustain, if not compel, a finding that
defendant was not coerced or threatened with
immediate use of unlawful physical force when
he aided and abetted in rape, there was no need
to determine whether to use a subjective or
objective standard as to defendant's perception
of coercion or threat of force. State v. Alexander,
597 P.2d 890 (Utah 1979).
Elements of offense.
-Threat of injury.
Evidence was sufficient to show that the
victim was compelled to submit by threat of
death or serious bodily injury, where defendant
told her that he had a knife after he struck her
on the back with what she perceived to be the
butt of a knife. State v. John, 770 P.2d 994
(Utah 1989).
When a verbal threat of "death, or serious
bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any
person" is made during the course of a rape or
forcible sodomy, the aggravated circumstance
requirement of Subsection (l)(c) is fully satisfied. State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah
1989).

76-5-405

Error on jury verdict form.
Although the verdict form signed by the jury
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty of
"forcible sexual assault," but the information
had charged the defendant with "aggravated
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury intended; an error on the jury verdict form does
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
-Prosecutrix's
prior sexual activity.
Evidence of prosecutrix's prior sexual activity
is admissible in rape prosecution only when the
court finds under the circumstances of the
particular case such evidence is relevant to a
material factual dispute and its probative value
outweighs the inherent danger of unfair prejudice to the prosecutrix, confusion of issues,
unwarranted invasion of the complainant's privacy, considerations of undue delay and time
waste and the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260
(Utah 1980). (See also U.R.E. 412.)
Evidence of the complainant's last consensual intercourse was not relevant to the issue of
her consent under the facts presented, and its
exclusion, therefore, did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right of confrontation.
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985).
Probative value of evidence of victim's prior
consensual intercourse with a neighbor was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. State v.
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (1989).
-Sufficient.
Evidence, including the victim's voice identification of the defendant, along with ample
circumstantial evidence to corroborate this
identification, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault, even though the victim neither recognized any peculiarities of speech nor possessed
prior familiarity with the defendant's voice.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault,
where the victim testified that defendant approached her from behind and held a sharp
object against her neck before raping her, and
there was medical evidence of sperm in the
victim's vagina. State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874
(Utah 1988).
Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under this section. See State v. Young, 780
P.2d 1233 (1989); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d
424 (1989).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, where defendant grabbed the
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victim from behind, fondled her legs, breasts,
and vaginal area, and the jury could reasonably
conclude that the encounter was not consensual
and that the assault was perpetrated by force
and fear, including the use of a knife as a
dangerous weapon. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d
475 (Utah 1989).

Forcible sexual abuse distinguished.
Aggravated sexual assault is distinguishable
from forcible sexual abuse. State v. Cude, 784
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989).
Instructions.
-Deviation
from information.
Difference in wording between information,
citing this section and charging defendant with
causing bodily injury to the victim "in the
course of a rape or attempted rape, or forcible
sodomy," and jury instruction using the same
wording except for substitution of"forcible sexual abuse, or attempted forcible sexual abuse"
in place of "forcible sodomy" was not prejudicial
and was not plain error. State v. Ellifritz, 835
P.2d 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
-Failure to follow.
Where defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault, and the jury, after being
instructed that it could find him guilty of only
one lesser included offense, convicted him of
object rape, forcible sodomy, and forcible sexual
abuse, the object rape conviction was affirmed
and the other two convictions were vacated as
surplusage. State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48
(Utah 1989).
Lesser included offenses.
The offenses of aggravated assault, § 76-5103, and assault, § 76-5-102, are lesser included offenses of aggravated sexual assault.
State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982).
Rape distinguished.
Aggravated assault, rather than rape, was
established by evidence that defendant lured
victim to acquaintance's house to attend a
party, held her captive there for four days, beat
her with his fists, placed his hands upon her
throat, took her clothes from her, repeatedly
raped her and threatened her with violence.
State v. Anselmo, 558 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977).
Elements of the two crimes of rape and aggravated sexual assault are not the same, since
the latter offense includes the additional element of infliction or threat of serious bodily
injury. State v. Smathers, 602 P.2d 708 (Utah
1979).
There is a sufficient difference between rape
and aggravated sexual assault to justify the
statutory distinction between the two offenses.

State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989).
Aggravated sexual assault encompasses a
broader scope of criminal conduct than rape,
and it includes attempted criminal conduct;
thus, rape is not a predicate felony for aggravated sexual assault because the two crimes
require proof of different elements. State v.
Hancock, 874 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Sentences.
-Constitutionality.
Four concurrent 10-year minimum mandatory sentences on four counts of aggravated
sexual assault were not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the severity of the crimes.
State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988).
Imposition of the minimum mandatory sentence of five years to life upon defendant's
conviction of aggravated sexual assault did not
violate the state constitution's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. State v.
Cude, 784 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1989).
-Upheld.
Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory
sentences for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault were not cruel and
unusual punishment, even though defendant
committed crimes as a juvenile, because he was
properly tried as an adult and several aggravating circumstances were present. State v.
Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990).
Separate acts.
Where an act of digital penetration preceded
a penile contact, and the former act was in no
way necessary to the latter act, the two acts
were not part of the "same act" and could
support two counts of aggravated sexual assault based on separate acts of forcible sexual
abuse and forcible sodomy. State v. Young, 780
P.2d 1233 (1989).
Testimony of child.
Eight-year-old boy is competent to testify to
act of sodomy committed upon him; and his
testimony, corroborated by his identification of
the defendant, his previous description of defendant's clothing and sleeping bag, and the
testimony of other witnesses, was sufficient to
sustain conviction. State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272
(Utah 1975).
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986); State v. Wade, 725 P.2d 1316 (Utah
1986); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah
1989); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989);
State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah
1992).
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76-5-406.

Sexual intercourse,
sodomy, or sexual abuse
without consent of victim - Circumstances.

An act of sexual intercourse, rape, attempted rape, rape of a child, attempted
rape of a child, object rape, attempted object rape, object rape of a child,
attempted object rape of a child, sodomy, attempted sodomy, sodomy upon a
child, attempted sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, attempted forcible
sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, attempted sexual abuse of a child, or
simple sexual abuse is without consent of the victim under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct;
(2) the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or violence;
(3) the actor is able to overcome the victim through concealment or by
the element of surprise;
(4) (a) (i) the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to
retaliate in the immediate future against the victim or any other
person, and the victim perceives at the time that the actor has the
ability to execute this threat; or
(ii) the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to
retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and
the victim believes at the time that the actor has the ability to
execute this threat;
(b) as used in this subsection "to retaliate" includes but is not
limited to threats of physical force, kidnapping, or extortion;
(5) the victim has not consented and the actor knows the victim is
unconscious, unaware that the act is occurring, or physically unable to
resist;
(6) the actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect, the
victim is at the time of the act incapable either of appraising the nature of
the act or of resisting it;
(7) the actor knows that the victim submits or participates because the
victim erroneously believes that the actor is the victim's spouse;
(8) the actor intentionally impaired the power of the victim to appraise .
or control his or her conduct by administering any substance without the
victim's knowledge;
(9) the victim is younger than 14 years of age;
(10) the victim is younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the
offense the actor was the victim's parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or
legal guardian or occupied a position of special trust in relation to the
victim as defined in Subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(h); or
(11) the victim is 14 years of age or older, but not older than 17, and the
actor is more than three years older than the victim and entices or coerces
the victim to submit or participate, under circumstances not amounting to
the force or threat required under Subsection (2) or (4).

159

76-5-406

CRIMINAL CODE

History: C. 1953, 76-5-406, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-406; 1983, ch. 88, § 26;
1988, ch. 156, § 2; 1989, ch. 259, § 1; 1992,
ch. 64, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amend-

ment, effective April 27, 1992, inserted "or
occupied a position of special trust in relation to
the victim as defined in Subsection 76-5404.1(3)(h)" in Subsection (10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
combination with the legal determination that
children are incapable of consent, suggests that
when an older person attempts to touch sexually a child under the age of fourteen, there is
always a substantial risk that physical force
will be used to ensure the child's compliance.
Sexual abuse of a child is therefore a crime of
violence. United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d
377 (10th Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

Consent.
Crime of violence.
Drugs and threats.
Earnest resistance.
Evidence of victim's character.
Force and threats.
Use as jury instruction.
Cited.

Consent.
One does not surrender the right to refuse
sexual intimacy by the act of accepting
another's company or even by encouraging and
accepting romantic overtures. State v. Myers,
606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980); State v. Herzog, 610
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980).
Determination of whether consent was
present or absent in any given case is factual in
nature, and thus a matter for determination by
the finder of fact; reviewing court will not
overturn any determination in that regard unless there appears of record such evidence that
reasonable minds could not agree with the
verdict reached. State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250
(Utah 1980); State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281
(Utah 1980).
Fact that prosecutrix accepted ride from defendant, accompanied him to a store where she
bought beer for the two of them, and agreed to
ride into a canyon with him was not legally
determinative of question of consent. State v.
Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980).
Fact that prosecutrix assisted defendant in
achieving erection by means of manual stimulation did not establish consent in view of fact
that prosecutrix was held against her will and
expressly threatened with violence. State v.
Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980).
When the state presents evidence in a rape
and forcible sodomy case that the victim is
under 14 years of age, no other evidence is
needed to establish the victim's lack of consent
to the acts. State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58 (Utah
1984).
If the victim did consent in fact to act of
intercourse but was under age of 14, the law
treats the act as having been done without
consent, and only in that circumstance is the
age of the victim an element of crime of rape.
Smith v. Morris, 690 P.2d 560 (Utah 1984).
Crime of violence.
A common sense view of this section, in

Drugs and threats.
Victim who was given pill probably containing chloral hydrate which rendered her weak,
dizzy, and almost unconscious, and was then
threatened with a beer bottle, did not consent
to sodomy. State v. Archuletta, 597 P.2d 1348
(Utah 1979).
Earnest resistance.
For a victim with an intellectual disability,
constant verbal refusals, combined with her
emotional distress and attempts to push defendant away, may establish earnest resistance
under the circumstances for purposes of former
Subsection (1). State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1987).
Evidence of victim's character.
Where evidence shows that association between defendant and prosecutrix came about in
peaceable manner, then transition into violence
is claimed, and there is genuine issue as to
consent, probative value of victim's reputation
as to moral character is sufficient to justify
admission of such evidence. State v. Howard,
544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975).
Force and threats.
Husband's requiring wife to have sexual intercourse with other men through psychological
abuse consisting of systematic harassment, intimidation and abuse which included threats of
violence to wife and her father, threats of separation of wife from her child, and threats of
blackmail was sufficient to overcome the resistance of a person of ordinary resolution and
establish lack of wife's consent, and, under such
circumstances, wife's failure to actively resist
did not constitute consent to the intercourse
with the other men. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d
594 (Utah 1980).
Use as jury instruction.
Instruction which included text of this section was sufficient, without further elaboration,
to meet the requirement of making clear to jury
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in rape case that the force and threats had to be
of such character and had such an effect on
prosecutrix as to overcome an earnest desire on
her part to resist. State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728
(Utah 1976).

76-5-406.5

Cited in In re J.F.S., 803 P.2d 1254 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Constitutional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Legislative Enactments - Criminal Law, 1990 Utah
L. Rev. 222.

A.L.R. - Rape or similar offense based on
intercourse with woman who is allegedly mentally deficient, 31 A.L.R.3d 1227.
Mistake or lack of information as to victim's
chastity as defense to statutory rape, 44
A.L.R.3d 1434.

76-5-406.5. Circumstances required for probation or suspension of sentence for certain sex offenses
against a child.
(1) In a case involving conviction for Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child;
Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child;
Subsections 76-5-404.1(3) and (4), aggravated sexual abuse of a child; and any
attempt to commit a felony under those sections, the court may impose an
indeterminate term for a first degree felony, or execution of sentence may be
suspended and probation may be considered only if all of the following
circumstances are found by the court to be present and the court in its
discretion, considering the circumstances of the offense, including the nature,
frequency, and duration of the conduct, and considering the best interests of
the public and the child victim, finds modification of the sentence from a
mandatory minimum term to an indeterminate term for a first degree felony or
probation to a residential sexual abuse treatment center is proper:
(a) the defendant did not use a weapon or use force, violence, substantial duress or menace, or threat of harm, in committing the offense or
before or after committing the offense, in an attempt to frighten the child
victim or keep the child victim from reporting the offense;
(b) the defendant did not cause bodily injury to the child victim during
or as a result of the offense and did not cause the child victim severe
psychological harm;
(c) the defendant, prior to the offense, had not been convicted of any
public offense in Utah or elsewhere involving sexual misconduct in the
commission of the offense;
(d) the defendant did not commit an offense described in Part 4 of this
chapter against more than one child victim or victim, at the same time, or
during the same course of conduct, or previous to or subsequent to the
instant offense;
(e) the defendant did not use, show, or display pornography or create
sexually-related photographs or tape recordings in the course of the
offense;
(f) the defendant did not act in concert with another offender during the
offense or knowingly commit the offense in the presence of a person other
than the victim or with lewd intent to reveal the offense to another;
(g) the defendant did not encourage, aid, allow, or benefit from any act
of prostitution or sexual act by the child victim with any other person or
sexual performance by the child victim before any other person;
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(h) the defendant admits the offense of which he has been convicted and
has been accepted for mental health treatment in a residential sexual
abuse treatment center that has been approved by the Department of
Corrections under Subsection (2);
(i) rehabilitation of the defendant through treatment is probable, based
upon evidence provided by a treatment professional who has been approved by the Department of Corrections and the Department of Human
Services under Subsection (2) and who has accepted the defendant for
treatment;
(j) the defendant has undergone a complete psychological evaluation
conducted by a professional approved by the Department of Corrections
and the Department of Human Services and:
(i) the professional's opinion is that the defendant is not an exclusive pedophile and does not present an immediate and present danger
to the community ifreleased on probation and placed in a residential
sexual abuse treatment center; and
(ii) the court accepts the opinion of the professional;
(k) if the offense is committed by a parent, stepparent, adoptive parent,
or legal guardian of the child victim, the defendant shall, in addition to
establishing all other conditions of this section, establish it is in the child
victim's best interest that the defendant not be imprisoned by presenting
evidence provided by a treatment professional who:
(i) is treating the child victim and understands he will be treating
the family as a whole; or
(ii) has assessed the child victim for purposes of treatment as
ordered by the court based on a showing of good cause;
(1) if probation is imposed, the defendant, as a condition of probation,
may not reside in a home where children younger than 18 years of age
reside for at least one year beginning with the commencement of treatment, and may not again take up residency in a home where children
younger than 18 years of age reside during the period of probation until
allowed to do so by order of the court; and
(m) a term of incarceration of at least 90 days is to be served prior to
treatment and continue until such time as bed space is available at a
residential sexual abuse treatment center as provided under Subsection
(2) and probation is to be imposed for up to a maximum of ten years.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall develop qualification criteria
for the approval of the sexual abuse treatment programs and professionals
under this section. The criteria shall include the screening criteria
employed by the department for sexual offenders.
(b) The sexual abuse treatment program shall be at least one year in
duration, shall be residential, and shall specifically address the sexual
conduct for which the defendant was convicted.
(3) Establishment by the defendant ofall the criteria of this section does not
mandate the granting under this section of probation or modification of the
mandatory minimum sentence that would otherwise be imposed by Section
76-3-406 regarding sexual offenses against children. The court has discretion
to deny the request based upon its consideration of the circumstances of the
offense, including:
(a) the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct;
(b) the effects of the conduct on any child victim involved;
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(c) the best interest of the public and any child victim; and
(d) the characteristics of the defendant, including any risk the defendant presents to the public and specifically to children.
(4) The defendant has 'the burden to establish by a preponderance of
evidence eligibility under aU of the criteria of this section.
(5) If the court finds a defendant granted probation under this section fails
to cooperate or succeed in treatment or violates probation to any substantial
degree, the mandatory minimum sentence previou~ly imposed for the offense
shall be immediately executed.
(6) If the court finds the defendant has established the criteria under
Subsections (l)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court may in its cliscretion modify the sentence under Section
76-3-406 by imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years to
life as an alternative to imposing the mandatory minimum sentence. A court
may not modify the mandatory minimum sentence to an indeterminate term of
five years to life and then suspend execution of that sentence and impose
probation.
(7) The court shall enter written findings of fact regarding the conditions
established by the defendant that justify the modification of sentence or
granting of probation under this section.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-406.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 27; 1984, ch. 18, § 11; 1986,
ch.41,§ 2;1991,ch.62,§
1;1994,ch.64,§ 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rewrote Subsections (1) and (2); added present Subsection (3);
redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as
present Subsections (4) and (5); in present
Subsection (5), inserted "the court finds," "or

succeed," and "mandatory minimum"; and
added Subsections (6) and (7).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted the language beginning "In a case
involving conviction" and ending "attempt to
commit a felony under those sections" for "In a
case involving rape of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or sodomy upon a child" at
the be~nning of Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
bation upon consideration of "the circumstances of the offense, including the nature,
frequency, and duration of the conduct." State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Discretion of court.
Evidence.
Parent.
Probation.
-Eligibility.
Psychological harm.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Limiting probation to the class of persons
defined in this section is not discriminatory and
unconstitutional, because the state has an interest in preserving the family unit and protecting the child victim, and this section bears a
substantial relationship to that interest. State
v.Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v.
Bastian, 765 P.2d 902 (Utah 1988).
Discretion of court.
Even if the requirements of Subsections
(l)(a) through (I) are met, a trial court still has
discretion under Subsection (1)(1) to deny pro-

Evidence.
Nothing in Subsection (l)(g) or in the remainder of this section indicates that expert evidence is necessary. Evidence from a parent, the
victim, and those close to the victim, as well as
evidence concerning the circumstances of the
victim and his or her family, may prove what a
victim's best interests are without the aid of
expert testimony. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d
1064 (Utah 1993).
Parent.
A person who is not the parent of a child and
has not entered into a solemnized marriage
with a child's parent may still be the "stepparent" of that child under this section if the
relationship qualifies as a valid marriage under
§ 30-1-4.5. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064
(Utah 1993).
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Subsection (1) of this section. State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Subsection (3) of this section gives the court
discretion to deny the request for probation
based on its consideration of the circumstances
of the offense and impose the minimum mandatory sentence. State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d
372 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The trial court's findings that defendant did
not meet the statutory qualifications of this
section were not clearly erroneous, where there
was ample evidence to support the trial court's
finding that the victim suffered severe psychological harm from defendant's conduct. State v.
Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Probation.
-Eligibility.
In order to be considered for probation a
defendant must demonstrate his eligibility under all of the criteria set forth in Subsection (1);
imposition of the minimum mandatory fiveyear sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment of a defendant unable to satisfy two of
the criteria. State v. Larson, 758 P.2d 901 (Utah
1988).
A defendant convicted of a sexual crime
against a child can receive probation or reduction of sentence only if he satisfies all the
enumerated requirements of this section. If a
defendant does not meet all the requirements,
§ 76-3-406 precludes the granting of probation
under any other statute. State v. Gibbons, 779
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989).
A defendant convicted of a sexual crime
against a child can receive probation or reduction of the minimum mandatory sentence only
if he or she satisfies by a preponderance of the
evidence all the enumerated requirements of

76-5-407.

Psychological harm.
Substantial psychological harm is not the
same as "severe psychological harm," which is
the standard fixed by Subsection (l)(b). State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993).
Cited in Herman v. State, 821 P.2d 457
(Utah 1991).

Applicability of part - "Penetration" or "touching" sufficient to constitute offense.

(1) The provisions of this part do not apply to consensual conduct between
persons married to each other.
(2) In any prosecution for unlawful sexual intercourse, rape, rape of a child,
object rape of a child, or sodomy, any sexual penetration or, in the case of
sodomy, rape of a child, or object rape of a child any touching, however slight,
is sufficient to constitute the relevant element of the offense.
(3) In any prosecution for sodomy on a child, sexual abuse of a child, or
aggravated sexual abuse of a child any touching, even if accomplished through
clothing, is sufficient to constitute the relevant element of the offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-407, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-407; 1974, ch. 32, § 13;
1977, ch. 86, § 5; 1979, ch. 73, § 5; 1988, ch.
181,§ 1;1989,ch.255,§
1;1991,ch.267,§
2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection (1),

inserted "consensual" and deleted "except for
purposes of this part, persons living apart pursuant to a lawful order of a court of competent
jurisdiction are not considered to be married"
from the end of the subsection.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Penetration.
Sodomy.

Evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's finding of penetration. See State v.
Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1988).

Penetration.
Emission of semen is not necessary to crime
of rape; penetration is all that is necessary.
State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 1984).

Sodomy.
Penetration is not a necessary element of the
offense of sodomy; touching alone is sufficient.
State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Utah
Task Force on Gender And Justice: Report to

76-5-408.
76-5-409.

the Utah Judicial Council, March 1990, 16 J.
Contemp. L. 135 (1990).

Reserved.
Corroboration
ment.

of admission

by child's

state-

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law requiring corroboration of admissions or confessions, and notwithstanding any prohibition of hearsay evidence,
a child's statement indicating in any manner the occurrence of the sexual
offense involving the child is sufficient corroboration of the admission or the
confession regardless of whether or not the child is available to testify
regarding the offense.
(2) A child, for purposes of Subsection (1), is a person under the age of 14.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-409, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 28.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah
1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case
had prior sexual experience for purposes of

76-5-410.

showing alternative source of child's ability to
describe sex acts, 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

Child victim of sexual abuse as competent
ness.

wit-

A child victim of sexual abuse under the age of ten is a competent witness
and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial
proceeding. The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility of the
testimony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-410, enacted by L.
1983,ch.88,§ 29; 1985,ch.74,§
1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Admissibility of testimony.
In general.
Victim.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section is not void for vagueness. State v.

Loughton, 747 P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).
Application of this section in a case where the
statute had become effective after the crime
was committed but before the trial did not
violate the federal constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814,
110 S. Ct. 62, 107 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989).
Allowing the child victim to testify pursuant
to this section did not deny defendant his right
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to confrontation, where the record demonstrated that defendant's cross-examination was
very effective, so effective that the child recanted and denied the abuse. State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814,
110 S. Ct. 62, 107 L.. Ed. 2d 29 (1989).

Admissibility of testimony.
Admission of testimony of a child victim of
sodomy that met the standard of Rules of
Evidence 403, governing exclusion of relevant
evidence, did not deprive defendant of his due
process right to a fair trial. State v. Fulton, 742
P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1988).

In general.

This section is not superseded by the Utah

Rules of Evidence. State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d
426 (Utah 1987).

Victim.
The term "victim," as used in this section and
§ 76-5-411, should be interpreted as meaning
"alleged victim," so that it is not necessary to
prove actual abuse before presenting the evidence allowed by these sections; otherwise, the
court would be required in many cases to find
the defendant guilty before the prosecution
could present its evidence. State v. Loughton,
747 P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).
Cited in State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L.
Rev. 461.
Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing
Defendants' Confrontation Clause Rights
Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 407.

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).
A.L.R. - Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or
credibility of complainant in sexual offense
prosecution, 45 A.L.R.4th 310.
Witnesses: child competency statutes, 60
A.L.R.4th 369.

76-5-411. Admissibility of out-of-court statement
victim of sexual abuse.

of child

(1) Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, a child victim's out-of-court
statement regarding sexual abuse of that child is admissible as evidence
although it does not qualify under an existing hearsay exception, if:
(a) the child is available to testify in court or under Rule 15.5(2) or (3),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(b) if the child is not available to testify in court or under Rule 15.5(2)
or (3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is other corroborative
evidence of the abuse; or
(c) the statement qualifies for admission under Rule 15.5(1), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) Prior to admission of any statement into evidence under this section, the
judge shall determine whether the interest of justice will best be served by
admission of that statement. In making this determination the judge shall
consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the
abuse, the relationship of the child to the offender, and the reliability of the
assertion and of the child.
(3) A statement admitted under this section shall be made available to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or proceeding, to provide him
with an opportunity to prepare to meet it.
(4) For purposes of this section, a child is a person under the age of 14 years.
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History: C. 1953, 76-5-411, enacted by L.
1983,cb.88,§ 30;1985,ch.74,§
2;1988,cb.
156, § 3; 1989, ch. 187, § 5.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
make her constitutionally unavailable for
cross-examination and defendant's right to confrontation was not violated. State v. Seale, 853
P.2d 862 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Age.
Corroborating evidence.
Court findings.
Court rules.
Credibility.
Effect of noncompliance.
Termination of parental rights.
Victim.
Videotapes.
Waiver of objection.
Weighing reliability and need.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Admission of the victim's out-of-court statements did not violate defendant's constitutional
right to confront witnesses where the victim
was available to testify on cross-examination
regarding the subject matter of the hearsay
declarations. State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353
(Utah 1986).
This section is not void for vagueness. State v.
Loughton, 747 P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).
The age specification in this section is not
arbitrary and capricious, bears a reasonable
relation to the purpose of the legislation, and,
therefore, is not a classification that violates
equal protection. State v. Laughton, 747 P.2d
426 (Utah 1987).
Application of this section in a case where the
statute had become effective after the crime
was committed but before the trial did not
violate the federal constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814,
110 S. Ct. 62, 107 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989).
Admission of a child victim's out-of-court
statements pursuant to this section does not
abridge a defendant's right to confrontation if
the child victim is present and available to
testify and be cross-examined. State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62, 107 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989).
The confrontation right is not universally or
automatically violated by this section. State v.
Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
This section does not define an offense;
rather, it is a rule of evidence and procedure for
interpretation by the court. Therefore, a vagueness challenge to the statute is not appropriate.
State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
A victim's lack of memory at trial about
statements she had made on a videotape and
the fact that the victim was a child did not

Age.
'lb admit a statement by an older child based
on the conclusion that he acts or appears to be
under 12 ignores both the language and the
spirit of this section. State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d
479 (Utah 1989).
The word "age" in its common usage means
"the length of time during which a being or
thing has lived or existed," not the mental age
of a mentally retarded person. State v. Hallett,
796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 856
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).
Trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous construction of the term "age" met the test
for ineffective assistance where hearsay statements of a nineteen-year-old victim were admitted despite the fact that this section then
applied explicitly only to children under ten.
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).
Corroborating evidence.
In any case where the declarant is found
"unavailable" within the meaning of Subsection
(l)(b), the trial court may not rely on the
presence of corroborating evidence in determining under Subsection (2) that the "interest of
justice" warrants admission of that hearsay.
This is because Subsection (2) demands a determination of reliability that will at least satisfy federal and state confrontation clause concerns. State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah
1991).
Under Subsection (2), the presence of evidence tending to corroborate the truth of the
matter asserted in hearsay statements of an
alleged child victim can never be considered by
a court in making the "interest of justice" reliability determination. State v. Matsamas, 808
P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991).
Court findings.
The court must make findings detailing its
reasoning in admitting a statement under this
section. State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479 (Utah
1989).
A trial court faced with the admissibility of
out-of-court statements by an alleged victim of
child sexual abuse must determine the admissibility of that evidence under this section and,
in making that determination, must enter express findings and conclusions explaining why
it finds that "the interest of justice will best be
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served by admission of that statement." Such
findings are to focus on the trustworthiness and
reliability of the out-of-court statements. State
v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (1989).
Trial court's admission of the victim's hearsay statements without making the requisite
findings on the reliability of the statements was
reversible error, where the other evidence of the
two crimes charged, sodomy and rape, was
slight, and the hearsay may have been essential to prove the necessary elements of the
crime ofrape. State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048
(Utah 1991).
The trial court committed plain error by
failing to enter written findings in accordance
with this section. State v. Cook, 246 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Court rules.
This section is not superseded by the Utah
Rules of Evidence. State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d
426 (Utah 1987).
Because this section explicitly incorporates
Rule 15.5(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, all the requirements of both provisions
must be met for the proffered out-of-court statement to be admitted. Although the two provisions are couched in slightly different terms,
both seek the same end, a determination that
proffered out-of-court statements are sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be admitted.
State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1993).
Credibility.
Allowing a therapist to testify as to his opinion regarding a child sexual abuse victim's
credibility at the time out-of-court statements
were given by the victim was reversible error,
where the state made no attempt to prove that
the therapist's methodology was reliable, and it
could not be said that, absent the testimony
bolstering the credibility of the victim, there
would not have been a result more favorable to
defendant. State v. Nelson .. 777 P.2d 479 (Utah
1989).
Effect of noncompliance.
Failure to follow the requirements of this
section results in harmful error. State v.
Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Termination of parental rights.
This section does not apply in termination of
parental rights proceedings. State v. E.J.D. &
B.D., 876 P.2d 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Victim.
The term "victim," as used in§ 76-5-410 and

this section, should be interpreted as meaning
"alleged victim," so that it is not necessary to
prove actual abuse before presenting the evidence allowed by these sections; otherwise, the
court would be required in many cases to find
the defendant guilty before the prosecution
could present its evidence. State v. Loughton,
747 P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).

Videotapes.
It was prejudicial error in a child abuse case
to admit into evidence videotapes of an interview of the child victim with a psychologist,
when the tapes had not been presented to the
defendant for viewing, and the written reports
which had been given the defendant concerning
the videotapes did not sufficiently inform the
defendant of their contents so as to allow him
an opportunity to meet the statements contained therein at trial. State v. Loughton, 747
P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).
Normally, the trial court must comply with
the requirements of both this section and R.
Crim. P. 15.5 when considering videotaped outof-court statements of child victims of sexual
abuse. State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (1989).
Trial court's error in not making the findings
required under Subsection (2) was harmless,
where the court considered the analogous, if
not identical, requirement of R. Crim. P. 15.5
(l)(g) that the videotape not be admitted unless
the court determines that the recording is "sufficiently reliable and trustworthy and that the
interest of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." State v.
Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (1989).
Waiver of objection.
Social worker's cross-examination testimony
that the victim had told her that the abuse
"first started happening when I was five" was
properly admitted, since defendant's counsel
had introduced the witness's testimony on direct examination in order to discredit the victim. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (1989).
Weighing reliability and need.
Under this section, the court must carefully
weigh the reliability of the statement and the
need to admit it into evidence. State v. Nelson,
777 P.2d 479 (Utah 1989).
Cited in State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383
1986); State v. Fulton, 748 P.2d 1208
1987); State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599
1988); State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480
1989).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
449.
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 1986 Utah L.
Rev. 461.

Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing
Defendants' Confrontation Clause Rights
Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 407.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).

PART5
HIV TESTING - SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS
Severability Clauses. - Laws 1993, ch. 40, § 10 provides: "If any provision of this act, or the
application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this
act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application."

76-5-501.

Definitions.

For purposes of this part:
(1) "Convicted sexual offender" means a person or a juvenile as provided
in Subsection 76-5-502(1).
(2) "Department of Health" means the state Department of Health as
defined in Section 26-1-2.
(3) "HIV infection" means an indication of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) infection determined by current medical standards and
detected by any of the following:
(a) presence of antibodies to HIV, verified by a positive "confirmatory" test, such as Western blot or other method approved by the Utah
State Health Laboratory. Western blot interpretation will be based on
criteria currently recommended by the Association of State and
Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors;
(b) presence of HIV antigen;
(c) isolation of HIV; or
(d) demonstration of HIV proviral DNA.
(4) "HIV positive individual" means a person who is HIV positive as
determined by the State Health Laboratory.
(5) "Local department of health" means the department as defined in
Subsection 26A-1-102(5).
(6) "Positive" means an indication of the HIV infection as defined in
Subsection (3).
(7) "Sexual offense" means a violation of state law prohibiting a sexual
offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4.
(8) "Test" or "testing" means a test or tests for HIV infection conducted
by and in accordance with standards recommended by the Department of
Health.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-501, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 40, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 40 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

169

76-5-502

76-5-502.

CRIMINAL CODE

Mandatory testing-

Liability for costs.

(1) (a) A person who has entered a plea of guilty, a plea of no contest, a plea
of guilty and· mentally ill, a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or been
found guilty for violation of a sexual offense or an attempted sexual offense
under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, or a juvenile who is adjudicated to have
violated or attempted to violate state law prohibiting a sexual offense
under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, shall be required to submit to a
mandatory test upon the request of a victim or the parent or legal
guardian of the minor victim or victim of a sexual offense within six
months of conviction to determine if the offender is an HN positive
individual.
(b) The court shall order the convicted sexual offender to submit to the
test upon sentencing or as a condition of probation. The order to the
convicted sexual offender shall not include the identity and address of the
victim requesting the test. The court shall forward the order to the
Department of Health, including separate information about the victim's
identity and address for notification and counseling purposes.
(2) If the mandatory test has not been conducted, and the convicted offender
or adjudicated juvenile is already confined in a county jail, state prison, or a
secure youth corrections facility, the person shall be tested while in confinement.
(3) The secure youth corrections facility or county jail shall cause the blood
specimen of the offender as defined in Subsection (1) confined in that facility to
be taken and shall forward the specimen to the Department of Health.
(4) The Department of Corrections shall cause the blood specimen of the
offender defined in Subsection (1) confined in any state prison to be taken and
shall forward the specimen to the Department of Health as provided in Section
64-13-36.
(5) The person tested shall be responsible for the costs of testing, unless the
person is indigent. The costs will then be paid by the Department of Health
from the General Fund.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-502, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 40, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 40 be-

76-5-503.

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

to

Voluntary testing - Victim to request - Costs
paid by Crime Victim Reparations.

(1) A victim or minor victim of a sexual offense as provided under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4, may request a test for the HIV infection.
(2) (a) The local health department shall obtain the blood specimen from
the victim and forward the specimen to the Department of Health.
(b) The Department of Health shall analyze the specimen of the victim.
(3) The testing shall consist of a base-line test of the victim at the time
immediately or as soon as possible after the alleged occurrence of the sexual
offense. If the base-line test result is not positive, follow-up testing shall occur
at three months and six months after the alleged occurrence of the sexual
offense.
(4) The Crime Victim Reparations Fund shall pay for the costs of the victim
testing if the victim provides a substantiated claim of the sexual offense, does
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not test HIV positive at the base-line testing phase, and complies with
eligibility criteria established by the Crime Victim Reparations Act.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-503, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 40, § 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 40 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-5-504.

and counseling.

Victim notification

to

(1) The Department of Health shall provide the victim who requests testing
of the convicted sexual offender's human immunodeficiency virus status
counseling regarding HIV disease and referral for appropriate health care and
support services. If the local health department where the victim resides and
the Department of Health agree, the Department of Health shall forward a
report of the convicted sexual offender's human immunodeficiency virus status
to the local health department and the local health department shall provide
the victim who requests the test with the test results, counseling regarding
HIV disease, and referral for appropriate health care and support services.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 26-25a-101, the Department
of Health and a local health department acting pursuant to an agreement
made under Subsection (1) may disclose to the victim the results of the
convicted sexual offender's human immunodeficiency virus status as provided
in this section.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-504, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 40, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 40 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
Section
76-5a-1.
76-5a-2.

76-5a-1.

Legislative
determinations
Purpose of chapter.
Definitions.

Legislative
ter.

Section
76-5a-3.
76-5a-4.

determinations

Sexual exploitation of a minor.
Determination whether material
violates chapter.

-

Purpose

of chap-

The Legislature of Utah determines that the sexual exploitation of minors is
excessively harmful to their physiological, emotional, social, and mental
development; that minors cannot intelligently and knowingly consent to sexual
exploitation; that regardless of whether it is classified as legally obscene,
material that sexually exploits minors is not protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or by the First or Fifteenth sections of
Article I of the Utah Constitution and may be prohibited; and that prohibition
of and punishment for the distribution, possession, possession with intent to
distribute, and production of materials that sexually exploit minors is necessary and justified to eliminate the market for those materials and to reduce the
harm to the minor inherent in the perpetuation of the record of his sexually
exploitive activities. It is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit the production,
possession, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of materials
171

76-5a-2

CRIMINAL CODE

which sexually exploit minors, regardless
classified as legally obscene.

of whether the materials

are

History: C. 1953, 76-5a-1, enacted by L.
1983,ch.87,§
1;1985,ch.226,§
1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 171.
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
443.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Obscene Comparisons: Canadian and American
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Attitudes Toward Pornography Regulation, 19
J. Contemp. L. 51 (1993).
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of 18
USCS §§ 371 and 2252(a) penalizing mailing
or receiving, or conspiring to mail or receive,
child pornography, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 359.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Distribute" means the selling, exhibiting, displaying, wholesaling,
retailing, providing, giving, granting admission to, or otherwise transferring or presenting material or live performances with or without consideration.
(2) "Live performance" means any act, play, dance, pantomime, song, or
other activity performed by live actors in person.
(3) "Material" means any visual representation including photographs,
motion pictures, slides, videotapes, or other pictorial representations
produced or recorded by any mechanical, chemical, photographic, or
electrical means and includes undeveloped photographs, negatives, or
other latent representational objects.
(4) ''Minor" means a person younger than 18 years of age.
(5) ''Nude or partially nude" means any state of dress or undress in
which the human genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or the female breast, at
a point below the top of the areola, is less than completely and opaquely
covered.
(6) "Produce" means the photographing, filming, taping, directing,
producing, creating, designing, or composing of material or live performances or the securing or hiring of persons to engage in the production of
material or live performances.
(7) "Sexual conduct" means and includes the following acts, whether
actual or simulated, regardless of the gender of the participants or their
state of dress:
(a) sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse;
(b) masturbation;
(c) sodomy or bestiality;
(d) sadomasochistic activities;
(e) the fondling or touching for purpose of sexual arousal of the
genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or female breast; or
(f) the explicit representation of the defecation or urination functions.

172

76-5a-4

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN

(8) "Simulated sexual conduct" means a feigned or pretended act of
sexual conduct which duplicates, within the perception of an average
person, the appearance of an actual act of sexual conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-5a-2, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 87, § 1; 1985, ch. 226, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
expressly prohibited sexual exploitation of all
persons under eighteen regardless of marital
status. State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).

ANALYSIS

Minor.
-Marital status irrelevant.
Partial nudity.

Minor.
-Marital status irrelevant.
This section defines a minor as "a person
younger than 18 years of age." In cases involving sexual exploitation of a minor and dealing
in harmful material to a minor, the legislature

76-5a-3.

Sexual exploitation

Partial nudity.
Even though child was wearing a gymnastics
suit when photographed, her state of dress fit
the minimal technical definition of partial nudity. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct.
App.), aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).

of a minor.

(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor:
(a) When he knowingly produces, distributes, possesses, or possesses
with intent to distribute, material or a live performance depicting a nude
or partially nude minor for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or
any person's engagement in sexual conduct with the minor.
(b) If he is a minor's parent or legal guardian and knowingly consents
to or permits that minor to be sexually exploited under Subsection (l)(a)
above.
(2) Sexual exploitation of a minor is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5a-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 87, § 1; 1985, ch. 226, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), aff'd, 852 P.2d 981
(Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Intent.
Sexual abuse of child.

Intent.
Evidence insufficient to support inference of
intent by defendants to allow photographing of
partially nude child. See State v. Workman, 806

76-5a-4. Determination
ter.

Sexual abuse of child.
Subsection (l)(a) and § 76-5-404.1 (sexual
abuse of a child) were not designed to proscribe
parallel conduct. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988).

whether

material

violates

chap-

In determining whether material is in violation of this chapter, the material
need not be considered as a whole, but may be examined by the trier of fact in
part only. It is not an element of the offense of sexual exploitation of a minor
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that the material appeal to the prurient interest in sex of the average person
nor that prohibited conduct need be portrayed in a patently offensive manner.
History: C. 1953, 76-5a-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 87, § 1; 1985, ch. 226, § 4.
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